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MICHIGAN

LAW

JANUARY, 1950

REVIEW
No. 3

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
George E. Palmer*

HE ambitious undertaking of the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws to draft a "Uniform Commercial Code" includes a proposed
revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law. This is not merely an
attempt to patch up the present statute. It is virtually a complete rewriting. It includes many changes and additions in substance as well
as a radical reorganization and rephrasing of language where no change
in substance is designed. ·It includes the much needed separation of
the provisions relating to investment instruments such as corporate
bonds from those relating to bills, checks, notes and other like instruments. The latter class of instruments is covered in Article 3 ("Commercial Paper"), the former, in Article 8 ("Investment Securities").
Article 3 also includes a division on bank collections, a subject not heretofore treated in any uniform act of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. 1
In the present paper discussion is limited to Article 3 dealing with
the traditional types of negotiable instruments, excluding however that
part of the Article on bank collections. Even thus limited, we are confronted with a proposed statute which encompasses every section of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. The indications are that this portion
of the Code is largely settled, both in form and substance, as it appears
in the draft issued in May 1949.2 It seems appropriate, therefore, to

T

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 The

''Bank Collection Code,'' which has been adopted by many states, was sponsored
by the American Bankers Association.
2 Prior to this draft, Article 3 had gone through several ''Preliminary Drafts,'' three
''Tentative Drafts" and two "Proposed Final Drafts." These were accompanied by excellent
''Notes .and Comments" on the present state of the law, presumably prepared by the Reporter
for Article 3, Dean William L. Prosser. The Chief Reporter for the entire code is Professor
Karl N. Llewellyn.
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discuss this draft on the assumption that even in details of language it
represents the final form. The discussion will be by reference to the
section numbers as they appear in the draft. 8 There is no attempt to
comment on every. aspect of the proposal which is worth comment.
That would require a treatise. The general quality of the revision is
high indeed. This is a large undertaking and it is to be expected that any
commentator will find some faults. The fact that faults are suggested
in this paper is not a fair reflection of the overall worth of the performance.
At the outset it was decided to frame what the Reporter, Dean
Prosser, described as a "tight statute."4 Like the NIL, the earlier drafts
provided that no instrument would be negotiable unless it satisfied the
formal requirements of the statute. In the latest draft there is some
departure from this rigidity. The instrument must conform in order to
be negotiable "within this Article," which ·as explained in the "official
comment''5 leaves open the possibility that new types of instruments
may be "recognized by the common law as negotiable, or as having
some attributes of negotiability." The shift of position indicates the
inherent difficulty of a choice which must be made between certainty
and Hexibility. There is no sure answer. It seems wise to resolve the
doubt in favor of permitting judicial recognition of new types of negotiable paper.
Sections 103, 105 and 112-Unconditional Promises and Luggage.
The familiar requirements for negotiability are stated in section 103,
with elaboration left to succeeding sections. One portion of section
103 provides that in order .to be negotiable the instrument must "contain an uncon~tional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money
and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or
drawer except as authorized by this Article." This of course includes
a number of the formal requirements, but discussion will be centered
on two: that the promise be unconditional and that in. general there
shall be no promises other than the principal money promise.
-8 The section numbers are 3-101 et seq. They will be referred to as sections 101 et seq.,
omitting the digit which identifies the article of which the section is a part.
4 Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1 (1946) 11. For a discussion of this aspect of the NIL,
see Aigler, "Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments," 24 CoL. L. RBv. 563
(1924).
5The code uses the novel device of "official comments" which, by section 1-102, "may
be consulted by the courts to determine the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of this
Act and may be used as a guide in its construction and application."
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Elaboration of the unconditional promise requirement is found in
section 105, which eliminates some present uncertainties and differences of opinion. There is now some uncertainty with respect to the
negotiability of an instrument which contains on its face sufficient to
show that the promise or order is subject to implied conditions. This
uncertainty doubtless will be removed by the provision in section I 05
to the substantial effect that the condition must be "expressly stated"
on the instrument in order to make the order or promise conditional.
The common recital in instruments "as per contract" is specifically
dealt with by providing that it does not affect negotiability. There is
substantial doubt under the NIL as to the negotiability of an instrument issued by an unincorporated association or a trustee where the
promise is limited to the assets of the association or the trust estate.6
It is proposed to settle the question by providing that negotiability
is not affected in either case, nor in the case of a similar limitation of
liability by a partnership.
Where an instrument given for the pri_c,e of goods purchased on
conditional sale contract refers to the contract in some manner, there
is conflict on the issue of negotiability. Two general types of clauses
have been involved. One simply refers to the fact that there is a conditional sale contract. 7 The other embodies the terms of the contract,
either in whole or in that part which provides for retention of title
in the seller. Neither the cases nor the writers have suggested separate
consideration of the two types of clauses, though it is clear that they
raise separable issues.8 The only substantial issue under the first type
is whether the promise is conditional. There is little excuse for a
holding that it is. The clause is fairly covered by NIL section 3,
which permits a "statement of the transaction which gives rise to the
instrument." In addition, any court which recognizes that the conditional sale contract is a security arrangement should treat the instrument the same as one which refers to the fact that it is secured by
6 Bonds of an unincorporated association with the promise so limited were held negotiable in Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N.Y. 167, 82 N.E. 1108 (1907). Bonds of a business trust
with a comparable limitation were held non-negotiable in Lorimer v. McGreevy, 229 Mo.
App. 970, 84 S.W. (2d) 667 (1935). Cf. Charles Nelson Co. v. Morton, 106 Cal. App.
144,288 p, 845 (1930).
7 Continental Guaranty Corp. v. Peoples Bus Line, 31 Del. 595 at 598 (1922). ("This
note is given covering deferred installments under conditional sale contract for a motor vehicle.•••" Held: the clause does not destroy negotiability).
s Britton, for example, lumps together the two types of cases, treating them both as
involving the effect on negotiability of a "recital on a note of an underlying contract of conditional sale." BRrIToN, BILLS AND NOTEs 62 (1943).
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mortgage. It is almost universally recognized that the mere reference
to a mortgage does not make the promise conditional or otherwise
affect negotiability. Although the two types of clauses have not been
carefully distinguished, it is significant that the cases found denying
negotiability have dealt with the second. Under the r:evision, it is
clear that a provision of the first type will be consistent with negotiability.
The real difference of opinion has been over clauses of the second
type. The tendency both before and after adoption of the NIL has ·
been to uphold negotiability,9 but there are cases to the contrary. The
clause involved in Central National Bank v. Hubbel1° is typical:
"This note ... having been given to said . . . [payee] as per
contract for certain apparatus, it is hereby agreed that ... title
to said apparatus remain in said ...· [payee] until this note is
fully paid."
The Massachusetts court held the note non-negotiable primarily on
the ground that the promise was conditional. The conditional promise
theory has been the one most commonly used by those courts which
deny negotiability. They have not agreed on exactly what the condition is, and the differing explanations all seem to rest upon a misconception of "the purpose and legal operation of a conditional sale
contract.11 Another ground sometimes used is that the clause is not
permissible "luggage,"12 that is, it is a promise in addition to the
money promise which is not consistent with negotiability.13
9 BruTroN, BrLLS AND NOTEs 62 (1943); note, 25 MrcH. L. REv. 668 (1927); comment,
7 TULANI! L. REv. 607 (1933).
10 258 Mass. 124 at 125, 154 N.E. 551 (1927).
11 In the Hubbel case, 258 Mass. 124, 154 N.E. 551 (1927), the court was satisfied
with the statement that the promise was "contingent upon fulfilment" of the conditional sale
contract, combined with reliance upon Sloan v. McCarty, 134 Mass. 245 (1883), a common
law decision. That case went on the ground that if the horse which was the subject of the
contract died before due date this would excuse payment of the price. The usual rule is to
the contrary on the sales question, placing the risk of loss on the buyer. VoLD, SALEs 281
(1931). In Third Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530 at 533 (1879), the court said that
there was an implied promise of the payee-seller to transfer title on payment of the note, that
this promise and the money promise were "concurrent conditions .•. in the nature of mutual
conditions precedent,'' and that this made the promise to pay conditional. But viewed as a
security arrangement, payment of the price operates to discharge the lien and there is no
necessity for the conditional seller to "transfer title." VoLD, SALES 276 (1931). For a more
complete discussion see comment, 7 TuLANE L. REv. 607 (1933).
12 The word is taken of course from Gibson's assertion that "a negotiable bill or note is
a courier without luggage." Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 at 347 (1846).
13 Sloan v. McCarty, 134 Mass. 245 (1883); Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan. 310 (1881).
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The revision is ambiguous on whether a provision such as that in
the Hubbel case prevents negotiability. It probably does not make
the promise conditional since section I 05 provides that a promise is
not conditional where the instrument "states that it is secured, whether
by mortgage, reservation of title or otherwise." But section 103 provides that an instrument is not negotiable if it is "subject to requirements of public filing or recording for the effectiveness against third
parties of any term therein." The clause in the Hubbel case evidenced
a conditional sale, which is commonly subject to recording acts. This
would seem to settle the matter jn favor of the Hubbel view, were it
not for the fact that the revisers apparently intend to reject that
holding. The official comment to section 105 says that the portion
of the section already quoted is intended to settle a conflict in the
decisions, "over the effect of 'title security notes' and other instruments
which recite the security given" and to adopt "the position of the great
majority of the courts." The majority view rejects the holding of the
Hubbel case. And in his comments to an earlier draft, the Reporter
stated that section 105 "rejects the holdings of ·such cases as Central
Trust Co. v. Hubbel, ... that a recital of security destroys the negotiability of the instrument."14 Nonetheless, a fair reading of the statute itself leads to acceptance of that holding and to rejection of the
position which has generally been accepted since 1890 when the
Supreme Court decided Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants Bank.15
It may be, as will be suggested later,16 that the law relating to
negotiability of notes issued in connection with conditional sale contracts needs re-examination in the light of current practices. One effect
14 Notes to Tentative Draft No. 1 (1946) 32. ,
111136 U.S. 268 (1890). An official comment to section 103 cites as an example of the
kind of instrument which should not be negotiable that involved in Abingdon Bank & Trust
Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co., 316 ill. App. 79, 43 N.E. (2d) 857 (1942). The holding in
favor of negotiability is criticized on the ground that the writing was "in substance and essence
a conditional sale." What made it a conditional sale was a sentence reading:
"This note (with one other) is given for John Deere Tractor and I hereby agree
that title thereto, and to all repairs and extra parts furnished therefor, shall remain
in the payee, owner or holder of this note until this and all other notes given therefor
shall have been paid in money."
There is no significant difference between this clause and that in the Hubbel case. True
the clause refers to another note but that is not the reason given by the Reporter for condemning
it. Nor is there any significant difference in the following provision found in the Chicago
Railway Equipment case: " ... it is agreed by the maker hereof that the title to said cars shall
remain in the said payee until all the notes ••• are fully paid••••"
16 See infra, p. 267, under Section 120.
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of negotiability has been to insulate a finance company from the
defaults of a seller with whom it has close business relationships.
But the revision does not rest on this consideration, nor will it be
effective to change the present pattern since the note easily can be
made negotiable. The consideration which has dominated this part of
the revision is to eliminate from the field of negotiability what the
Reporter has called "cluttered paper."17 This is reminiscent of Gibson's attempt a century ago to make negotiable paper a "courier without luggage."18
Reference has been made to the occasional holding under the NIL
that a title _retention clause destroys negotiability because it is a promise
in addition to the money promise which is not permitted by section 5.
The clause is not specifically authorized by that section; nonetheless,
it has generally been thought consistent with negotiability. The listing of permissible provisions has not been treated as exhaustive. The
revision will make an important change in this respect, for it apparently attempts an exhaustive list of permissible clauses which contain
a "promise, order, obligation or power." No such clause is permitted
"except as authorized by this Article." Exceptions are contained principally in section 112. It is a mistake to attempt exhaustive enumeration. Decisions before and under the NIL show a process of change
guided by a useful principJe. This is exemplified by the acceptance
of a maker's agreement to furnish additional security, specifically
recognized in section 112. The present statute is silent on the point,
but most decisions have upheld negotiability.19 It has been viewed,
in the words of the New York court, as a promise "to do an act in
aid of, and incidental to, the payment of money." 20 The court relied
on Chafee's generalization: 21
"The question in every case is not whether the act is technically 'additional' to the payment of money, but whether it is substantially so. If its real purpose is to aid the holder to secure the
payment of money and protect him from the risks of insolvency,
if it steadies the value of the note, and makes it circulate more
readily, then it should not be fatal to negotiability."
17 Notes to Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947) 20.
18 Supra note 12.
10 Kennedy v. Broderick, (C.C.A. 7th) 216 F.

137 (1914); Finley v. Smith, 165 Ky.
445, 177 S.W. 262 (1915); City Nat. Bank v. Adams, 266 Mass. 239, 165 N.E. 470 (1929);
First Nat. Bank v. Blackman, 249 N.Y. 322, 164 N.E. 113 (1928).
20 First Nat. Bank v. Blackman, 249 N.Y. 322, 164 N.E. 113 (1928).
21 Chafee, "Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper," 32 HARv. L. RBv. 747 at 783 (1919).
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This approach is not new. It guided the courts at common law.
Gibson looked with disfavor, in Overton v. Tyler, 22 upon a waiver of
the benefit of appraisement laws but twenty-five years later, when the
issue was squarely before the Pennsylvania court, it held for negotiability.23 The court observed that the effect of the provision was to
"facilitate the collection by waiving certain rights which . . . [ the
maker] might exercise to delay or impede it. Instead of clogging its
negotiability it adds to it, and gives additional value to the note."
The NIL recognizes the propriety of such a waiver clause, as does the
revision. Both also recognize clauses authorizing the sale of collateral
security or a confession of judgment at maturity. Each of these gained
recognition at common law, not by accident, but because they were
merely incidental to the main obligation and "facilitated its collection."
Instead of the vain attempt at exhaustive enumeration we need in
the statute a recognition of this guiding principle.

Section 1OB-Demand Instruments. This section deals more explicitly than the present statute with the question as to when a cause
of action arises on a demand instrument. The relevant provision reads:
"A cause of action against the maker of a note payable on demand accrues upon its issue, or if postdated upon the stated date.
A cause of action on a certificate of deposit does not accrue until
demand."
Under the NIL the cause of action on a demand note has been
held to· arise at the time of issuance, with the result that the failure
of the holder to enforce payment during the period prescribed by the
statute of limitations bars his claim.24 This is the position taken in
the present section as to notes, but the section wisely excepts certificates of deposit, on which courts have differed. The rule proposed
for certificates of deposit undoubtedly fits common understanding and
follows the present majority view. 25 A bank depositor surely does not
conceive that his deposit claim against a bank may be barred by the
passage of time, nor is it apart from special statute. In much the same
way, he doubtless looks upon a demand certificate of deposit primarily
as written evidence of "money on deposit." Apparently the section is
22

Supra note 12.

2s Zimmerman v. Anderson, 67 Pa. 421 at 422 (1871).
24 BlU'lTON, BILLS AND NOTES 776 (1943).
25 Note, 37 MICH. L. REv. 1306 (1939); BlU'lToN, BILLs AND NOTES

776-7 (1943).
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not intended to apply to time certificates of deposit, though the applicable sentence does not exclude them.
The section is defective in making provision only for notes and
certificates of deposit, for the same problem has arisen in connection
with certified checks. In Dean v: Iowa-Des Moines National Bank,26
the court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run on
a demand certificate of deposit until demand and that the same rule
applied to a check certified at the request of the holder. Upon certification, the court concluded, the check "became in legal effect an
ordinary demand certificate of deposit." 27 The conclusion is highly
debatable. A certified check may be the equivalent of a demand certificate of deposit on a purely formal level, in that the holder of each
instrument has a claim against a bank payable on demand. But the
two instruments serve different business purposes. A check is used
as a means of making payment and it seems unlikely that certification
would be thought by the holder to put him in the position of a bank
depositor. In any event, the problem should b,e dealt with in the
statute whether the view of the Dean case is accepted or rejected.
Section 109-Time Certainty. This section reads in part:
"(I) An instrument is payable at a definite -time if by its
terms it is payable at a stated date or
(a) at a fixed period after a stated date; or
(b) at a fixed period after sight; or
(c) at a definite time subject to any acceleration; or
(d) at a definite time subject to extension at the option of
the holder, or to extension to a further definite time at the option
of the maker or automatically upon a specified act or event."

I. The principal change is with respect to the negotiability of an
instrument containing an acceleration provision. Adhering to a common law tendency, the decisions under the NIL usually have held
that power to accelerate at the "whim or caprice" of the holder is
incompatible with negotiability.28 On the other hand, negotiability
usually is not affected by acceleration at the option of the maker, or
at the option of the holder upon the happening of an event which is
2s 227 Iowa 1239, 281 N.W. 714, 290 N.W. 664 (1940).
27 227 Iowa at
28 " ••• a note

1256. Accord: Girard Bankv. Bank of Penn Twp., 39 Pa. 92 (1862).
containing language providing for the power of acceleration of the due
date upon the caprice or whim of the holder is thereby :rendered nonnegotiable." American
Finance Corp. v. Bourne, 190 Okla. 332 at 333, 123 P. (2d) 671 (1942).
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either within the control of the maker or is not controlled by either
party, or which occurs automatically upon the happening of such an uncontrolled event. 29 Section 109 eliminates this distinction by the provision that the time of payment is sufficiently certain where an instrument is payable "at a definite time subject to any acceleration."
However, the actual operation of an option given the holder is
affected by section ll9 which provides in part that
"A holder's option to accelerate at will or 'where he deems
himself insecure' or the like ... gives power to do so only in the
good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired but
the burden of establishing lack of gbod faith is on the obligor."
It has always been difficult to explain why an uncontrolled power of
acceleration in the holder should destroy negotiability. By- reference
to a historic test for determining negotiability it would seem that paper
is more readily marketable when the power is in the holder than when
it is in the maker. Evidently the true motivation has been the feeling
that an arbitrary power in the holder gives him an unfair advantage
over the maker. This has been expressed, not by invalidating or limiting the power itself, but by holding that it makes the instrument nonnegotiable for lack of the requisite time certainty. The revisers propose to recognize the underlying reason and give it a more rational
expression.
This raises another problem however. Trouble is encountered
under the NIL when an instrument containing an acceleration clause
which has been exercised is negotiated prior to the fixed due date but
after the accelerated due date. If the holder takes without knowledge
of the acceleration, is he a purchaser before maturity so that he can
be a holder in due course? A forceful argument has been made for
reading the statute to reach an affirmative answer. 3 ° Certainly this is
the desirable result, but there is scant authority to support it.31 The
problem is solved in an almost satisfactory fashion by sections
302 and 304. By the former a holder in due course must take the
instrument "without notice that it is overdue." Thus a purchaser may
20 The problems are discussed in Chafee, "Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper," 32
HAnv. L. REv. 747 (1919); Aigler, "Time Certainty in Negotiable Paper," 77 UNIV. PA. L.
REv. 313 (1929).
30 Chafee, "Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper," 32 HAnv. L. REv. 747 at 759 et seq.
(1919).
31 Some support is found in Taylor v. American Nat. Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 S. 678
(1912) and Marion Nat. Bank v. Harden, 83 W. Va. 119, 97 S.E. 600 (1918). Contra:
Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84, 108 N.W. 212 (1906).
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be a holder in due course of overdue paper if he buys before the stated
due date without notice of acceleration. By section 304, he has such
notice if "he has reasonable grounds to believe ... that the instrument has become due by acceleration." But section 119 introduces
an unnecessary difficulty in the application of the language just quoted.
Instruments may provide, as in an Indiana case,32 that the holders
have "full power to declare this note due ... at any time they may
deem this note insecure, even before maturity of the same." Under
section 119 an attempted exercise of this power would not be operative
unless the holder had a "good faith belief that the prospect of payment is impaired." If the purchaser bought without notice of the
attempted exercise there is no difficulty. If he bought with notice,
however, whether he is a holder in due course apparently will depend
upon the finding made on the good faith issue. This introduces an
element of _uncertainty which is better avoided. Knowledge of the
attempted exercise of the power should be sufficient to prevent holding
in due course.33
2. Notes commonly provide that the "makers, indorsers and guarantors of this note, and the sweties hereon, severally ... consent that
the time of its payment may be extended without notice."34 Some
courts have found that the language means what it literally says, that
is, the holder can extend maturity without consent of the maker, from
which it is concluded that the time of payment is uncertain.35 Others
have construed the language to authorize extension only with the
consent of a principal maker, thereby sustaining negotiability.~ 6 This
is in recognition that the probable purpose of the clause is to preserve
the secondary or suretyship liability of parties to the instrument, including an accommodation maker, when time is extended to the principal obligor. The revision will eliminate the interpretation problem,
32 Guio v. Lutes, 97 Ind. App. 157 at 158, 184 N.E. 416 (1933) (held non-negotiable),
33 It could be argued that knowledge of an attempted acceleration gives a later purchaser

"reasonable grounds to believe" that the instrument is overdue, whether or not it is in fact.
But the basic requirement of the revision is that the instrument be taken "without notice that
it is overdue." It is difficult to read this as covering a case in which the instrument is not in
fact overdue. The official comment to section 302 pretty well forecloses the possibility. It
explains that the language "without notice that it is overdue" is used "in order to make it
clear that the purchaser of an instrument which is in fact overdue may be a holder in due
course if he takes it without notice that it is overdue."
34 The language is taken from Security Nat. Bank v. Gunderson, 52 S.D. 25 at 26, 216
N.W. 595 (1927). The note was held negotiable.
,
35 Quinn v. Bane, 182 Iowa 843, 164 N.W. 788 (1917); Smith v. Van Blarcom, 45
Mich. 371 (1881).
86 National Bank of Commerce v. Kenney, 98 Tex. 293, 93 S.W. 368 (1904).
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for section 119 provides that "Notwithstanding any term of the instrument, the holder may extend it only with the consent of the maker
at the time of extension." Nor will the clause affect negotiability
since it is covered explicitly by subsection I(d) of the present section.

Section 111-Bearer Paper. Where an instrument reads "pay to
the order of --," and is issued with the blank space untouched,
it is very likely order rather than bearer paper under the NIL. However, there is not much authority and the conclusion is not free of
doubt. The common law cases considered such paper payable to
bearer3 7 and the NIL is ambiguous. Probably the better statutory
construction is to treat the instrument as incomplete order paper. When
issued it is not negotiable for lack of a payee; the later £.lling in of
a payee's name turns it into a negotiable order instrument. 38
Under section 111 an instrument is to be payable to bearer when
payable to "'cash' or the order of 'cash,' or any other words which do
not purport to designate a speci£.c payee." This should remove most
of the uncertainty since the language makes it pretty clear that something must be written in the blank. One problem is not satisfactorily
solved however. If the maker draws a line through the blank space,
the instrument should be bearer paper just as though he had written
in "cash."39 In each case he has issued an instrument which is complete in the form he intended. In order to give. the same treatment
to the two cases it will be necessary to say that a line is "words."
Sections 116 and 406-Incomplete Instruments. Under NIL section 14, where an instrument is issued with blanks and completed in
excess of authority, a holder in due course can recover on the instrument as completed. Under NIL section 16, where an instrument has
been completed but not delivered, a holder in due course can recover
on the instrument despite the lack of delivery. Under NIL section 15,
non-delivery of an incomplete instrument is a defense even against
87 BxcBLow,

BILLS, NoTBs AND Cm!cxs, Lile's ed., 103 (1928).
SSTowerv. Stanley, 220 Mass. 429, 107 N.E. 1010 (1915). However, this classification
does not seem to correspond to practices with respect to traveler's checks. They are issued
with the name of the payee blank and are dealt with as negotiable paper in that form. Since
it is necessary to fit paper into either the order or bearer category, such a check might be treated
as bearer paper until a payee's name is inserted whereupon it becomes order paper. American
Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 179 Okla. 606, 67 P. (2d) 55 (1937). It is
questionable whether the revision makes adequate provision for such checks. See generally,
note, 47 YALB L. J. 470 (1938).
39 The contrary conclusion was reached at common law in Gordon v. Lansing State Sav.
Bank, 133 Mich. 143, 94 N.W. 741 (1903).
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a holder in due course. In short, either element alone constitutes a
personal ·defense but the two in combination are a real defense.
It is proposed to continue the rules of sections 14 and 16 but to
change that of section 15 by protecting a holder in due course against
the defense of non-delivery of an incomplete instrument.40 The desirability of the change is suggested by the decision in City Nat. Bank
of Galveston v. American Express Co.41 The Express Company signed
traveler's checks containing blanks (or so the court held) and turned
them over to a bank for issuance. When the checks were stolen and
£.lied in by the thief the court applied section 15 and held that a holder
in due course could not recover from the Express Company. This
ought to be considered a business risk of the Express Company, which
it can of course cover by insurance. Certainly it is in a better position than the purchaser to protect itself.
The holder in due course is to b~ protected where "an instrument
signed when incomplete" is thereafter completed in excess of authority.
A problem arises as to the meaning of "instrument," one which also
arises under NIL section 14 but which is more acute under the revision
with less help given to its solution. Clearly if a man signs his name
in the usual place on the usual check form this is an "instrument"
within the meaning of these sections. It should be equally clear that
if he signs his name on a blank page in an autograph book this is not
an "instrument." This is clear under the NIL, for section 14 furnishes
a guide: "a signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making
the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument .. .."42 No comparable guide to decision appears
in the revision. This is especially unwise because the change in NIL
Section 116 reads:
"(I) An instrument signed when incomplete in any necessary respect cannot be enforced
until completed, but when it is completed in accordance with authority given it is valid as
completed.
(2) If the completion is authorized [sic] the rules as to material alteration apply (Section
3-406), even though the paper was not delivered by the maker or drawer; but the burden of
establishing that any completion is unauthorized is on the party so asserting." (Italics added).
The relevant portion of section 406 reads:
"A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument according
to its original tenor [this applies to alterations], and when an incomplete instrument has been
completed, before he takes, he may enforce it as completed."
41 (Tex. 1929) 16 S.W. (2d) 278. A different conclusion was reached in American
Express Co. v. Anadarko Bank & Trust Co., 179 Okla. 606, 67 P. (2d) 55 (1937), on the
ground that the instrument was complete when stolen. It was in the same form as the chec1'
involved in the Galveston Bank case.
42 This seems to have been the test used at common law. Non.TON, BILLS AND NoT.l!s,
4th ed., 349 (1914).
40
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section 15 will increase the need for some basis of differentiation between what is an "instrument" and what is not.
Section 120-Contemporaneous Instruments. This deals with one
of the most puzzling situations in the :field of negotiable instruments.
It is axiomatic that the purchaser's knowledge that the instrument was
given for an executory promise does not affect his standing as a holder
in due course.43 He knows that the consideration may fail through
breach of contract by the payee, but this is not notice of an in:6.rmity.
There is ample justification for this general position. Its rejection
probably would mean that in a high percentage of cases negotiable
instruments taken in normal business transactions would not be taken
in due course.44 Nor would it be wise to penalize so extensively the
careful buyer who investigates the transaction in which the instrument
had its inception. This general position is adopted in section 304 of
the revision by the following provision:
"Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the
purchaser notice of an infirmity or claim ... (b) that. . . [ the
instrument] was issued or negotiated in return for an executory
promise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser has notice of any defense or claim arising from the terms
thereof."
On the other hand there are situations in which a purchaser who
knows the terms of a separate writing should take subject to those
terms. In National Bank of Wateroliet 11. Martin,45 a note for $7500
payable three months after date was issued jn connection with a separate
written agreement which provided for renewal every three months
upon payment of $250 against principal. The plaintiff bought the
note with knowledge of this agreement. A divided court held that
the plaintiff could recover the full principal amount, free of any right
in the maker to renew pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The
43 Grinnell Sav. Bank v. Gordon, 195 Iowa 208, 191 N.W. 852 (1923). Cases are cited
in B:stlTllL's BRANNAN, N:sconABLll INsTRUMllN'l'S LAw, 7th ed., 788 (1948).
44 Smith v. Ellis, 142 Miss. 444 at 456, 107 S. 669 (1926). ("it is a matter of common
knowledge that a considerable part of commercial paper in circulation has for its consideration
executory agreements by the payees").
45 203 App. Div. 390, 196 N.Y.S. 714 (1922); affirmed on the ground that the maker
did not make proper tender of $250 and a renewal note, 235 N.Y. 611, 139 N.E. 755 (1923).
In Federal Credit Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 264 N.Y.S. 723,
729 (1933), the appellate division concluded that the court of appeals meant to disapprove
the ground of decision in the Watervliet case as described in the text. This reads a great deal
into a one-sentence memorandum opinion.
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decision seems outrageous. The separate writing related to the ~erms
of the note itself and could be given meaning only by recognizing that
those terms were affected. Surely a purchaser with knowledge of such
facts should not be permitted to enforce the note according to its terms
alone.
If the Watervliet decision is rejected, and the revisers intend to
reject it by the present section,46 there remains the difficult task of
formulating a test which will differentiate such a case from the usual
executory promise case. Broadly the problem is the extent to which
the negotiable note will be separated from the underlying transaction .
. It is basic to the concept of negotiability that there may be such a
separation. In the usual executory promise case the separation is feasible. For breach of the agreement the maker will have his remedies
against the payee even though the breach is not a defense to an action
on the note by a purchaser. But the separation is not complete, as
demonstrated by the settled view that knowledge of a breach when
the note is taken subjects the purchaser to the breach as a defense. In
the Watervliet case the separation should not be made in favor of a
purchaser with notice of the contract because the terms of the contract
were such that it would necessarily be broken by enforcement of the
note pursuant to its terms alone. This suggests a working rule, admittedly vague but perhaps as precise as the situations permit: If the
separate agreement necessarily affects or clearly was intended to affect
the obligation on the negotiable instrument itself, a purchaser with
notice of the agreement takes subject thereto. 47
Section 120, which is intended to cover this problem, provides in
its relevant parts:
"As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any
transferee the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected
by any other written agreement executed as part of the same transaction, except that ... a holder in due course is not affected by
any limitation of his rights arising out of the separate agreement
of which he had no notice when he took the instrument."
46 The official comment to section 120 says that a holder in due course who takes with
notice takes subject to a provision in the separate writing "that under certain conditions the
note shall be extended for one year."
47 Of course, this does not automatically solve all cases. A difficult question is raised, for
example, by the separate agreement in Securities Inv. Co. v. Maxwell, 131 Misc. 160, 226
N.Y.S. 273 (1928). A note was given in connection with a conditional sale contract which
provided that if the buyer was not satisfied with the goods he could return them within thirty
days and the seller would "return all money paid" and cancel the contract. A purchaser with
notice was held to take subject to this provision.
·
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This is open to various interpretations-it can only be suggested that
it is susceptible of a reading in the terms described above. The key
words are "modified or affected" and "limitation of his rights." It is
a mistake to use both phrases, for only one concept is involved. If
the separate agreement "modifies" the negotiable instrument and the
purchaser takes with notice of the fact, this should end the matter.
Inquiry into whether the separate agreement "limits his rights" will
only lead to confusion and possible circularity of reasoning. In the
ordinary executory promise case, if the purchaser with notice is held
subject to the terms of the separate writing his rights are thereby
limited-but this gives no help in determining whether the agreement
contains that kind of limitation of rights which will bind him.
So far we have not touched upon the aspect of the problem which
has most troubled the courts, that is, the case in which the purchaser
takes an assignment of the separate agreement along with the note.
In First & Lumberman's National Bank 11. Buchholz48 the defendant
executed a conditional sale contract for the purchase of an automatic
coal burner which the seller agreed to install. Defendant also executed
a negotiable note payable to the seller which was attached to the contract by a perforated line. Prior to installation of the burner the note
and contract were sold to plaintiff bank in this form. In an action
on the note it was held that defendant could offset the damage resulting from faulty installation. The court recognized the general rule
that notice that the note was given for an executory promise does not
subject the purchaser to the defense of breach of that promise, but
held the rule inapplicable. The central fact was the assignment of the
contract with the note.
The cases qre in sharp disagreement. 49 Strong arguments can be
marshaled against the Buchholz decision. The purchaser does not
assume the seller's obligations on the contract and allowance of the
defense therefore cannot properly be rested on the ground that the
breach is his breach. He takes the assignment merely as security for
220 Minn. 97, 18 N.W. (2d) 771 (1945).
following cases held for the purchaser; United States v. Novsam Realty Corp.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 125 F. (2d) 456 (conditional sale-New York Jaw applied); United States
v. Bryant (D.C. Fla., 1945) 58 F. Supp. 663 (conditional sale-Florida law applied); Royal
Tire Service, Inc. v. Shades Valley Boys' Club, 232 Ala. 357, 168 S. 139 (1936); Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Heim, 120 Conn. 419, 181 A. 613 (1935) (land contract-Florida Jaw applied); Robertson v. Northern Motor Securities Co., 105 Fla. 644, 142 S. 226 (1932) (conditional sale); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 238 App. Div. 18, 263
N.Y.S. 39 (1933) (conditional sale); Petroleum Acceptance Corp. v. Queen Anne Laundry
Serv., 265 App. Div. 692, 40 N.Y.S. (2d) 495 (1943).
48

49 The

270

M:rcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

the note and ought not to be in a worse position than if he took an unsecured note. Even though the contract is not expressly assigned, as
a security arrangement it will pass with the transfer of the note-and
no case has suggested that the purchaser takes subject to the contract
terms except where there is an express assignment. 50 In the face of
such impressive arguments it is almost equally impressive that they
have been rejected by a substantial number of courts.51 Usually the
reasoning goes no further than this: as is true between the original
parties, the instruments "must be read together whenever they are
found together in the hands of the holder of the note."52 This is a
refusal to separate the note from the contract when they are in fact
treated as evidencing parts of a single transaction by the seller and
his financing agency.
Sections 120 and 304 of the revision apparently are intended to
reject the Buchholz view. 53 That case presents a group of related problems which need to be considered as a whole. The obvious initial
question is whether the note was rendered non-negotiable by the fact
that it was attached to a conditional sale contract.54 When the issue
presented has been that of the Buchholz case, negotiability usually has
been assumed. But suppose that the note had been detached from
the contract and negotiated alone to the purchaser. Here the issue
most frequently raised has been material alteration and decision usually
has turned on whether the detachment was authorized. If unauthorized, the assumption has been either that the note was not negotiable
while attached to the contract,55 or that the purchase of the writing
50 In addition it has been argued that the effect of subjecting the £nancing agency to the
maker's.defenses will be to increase the cost of such £nancing, to the detriment of this part of
our credit structure. Kripke, "The 'Secured Transactions' Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code," 35 VA. L. REv. 577 at 588-9 (1949).
51 The following cases are in accord with the Buchholz decision: Culbreath v. Guiter•
man, Rosenfield & Co., 217 Ala. 259, 115 S. 303 (1927), 219 Ala. 382, 122 S. 619 (1929);
Todd v. State Bank of Edgewood, 182 Iowa 276, 165 N.W. 593 (1917) (land contract);
Cooke v. Real Est. Trust Co., 180 Md. 133, 22 A. (2d) 554 (1941) (conditional sale contract); Von Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N.W. 823 (1935) (conditional sale
contract); General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Moon Carrier Corp., 129 N.J.L. 431, 29 A.
(2d) 843 (1942); State Nat. Bank v. Cantrell, 47 N.M. 389, 143 P. (2d) 592 (1943) (conditional sale); Federal Credit Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379, 264
N.Y.S. 723 (1933).
.
52 Federal Credit Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 238 App. Div. 379 at 386, 264
N.Y.S. 723 (1923).
58 Notes to Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947) 64.
54 Even though the contract is considered a part of the note, this does not necessarily
affect negotiability under the NIL since all of its provisions may be consistent with negotiability.
55 General Motors Acc. Corp. v. Garrand, 41 Idaho 151, 238 P. 524 (1925) (condi-
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in its original form would have subjected the purchaser to defenses
on the contract. Unless one of these assumptions is made it is difficult
to see why the separation is material. Courts have made no attempt
to correlate decisions in the two areas.
The material alteration sections of the NIL do not explicitly cover
such a case but this is to be remedied by section 406 of the revision.
An alteration of an instrument is material if it "changes the contract''
of any party ''by removing any part of'' the instrument. If it is not
assented to by such party, a holder in due course can enforce the
instrument "according to its original tenor." There is apt to be uncertainty as to how this section applies to the Buchholz situation. Solution is fairly easy if it is held, as some courts have,56 that the perforated
line amounts to assent to the separation. If this is denied, section 406
seems controlling. The rejection of Buchholz means that the revisers
are assuming the negotiability of the note while attached and are
asserting that purchase in that form does not subject the purchaser
to defenses on the contract. In order to give effect to section 406, however, this should be limited to a case in which separation is authorized.
If the decision in the Buchholz case has merit this is primarily
because of its effects in connection with installment sales of consumers'
goods. Several factors stand out: the treatment of the two instruments
as one by the discounting agency; the possibility that many buyers
of consumers' goods who sign negotiable instruments have no idea
of the usual legal consequences of negotiability; and :finally, the frequent close business relation between the :finance agency and the sellerpayee. It is a major task to work out a balanced solution. Probably
it would be unwise, and almost certainly it would prove ineffective,
to subject the purchaser to defenses on the contract simply because
it was assigned to him. When the note and contract are on one paper
and are transferred in that form it is suggested that results should
depend upon whether the maker fairly can be held to have authorized
separation. If not, the two instruments were expected to be treated
as one and should be so treated when purchased without separation.
Presumably the note is non-negotiable under section 103. Separation
should be a material alteration so that even a holder in due course
can enforce only "according to the original tenor." If separation is
tional sale); Harrison v. Union Store Co., 179 Ky. 672, 201 S.W. 31 (1918); Toledo Scale
Co. v. Gogo, 186 Mich. 442, 152 N.W. 1046 (1915) (conditional sale).
56 Muskegon Citizens Loan & Inv. Co. v. Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 241 N.W. 135
(1932); BRl'IToN, BILLS AND Nons 1063 (1943).
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authorized, then negotiability of the note should be determined from
its terms alone, and purchase of the two instruments even while attached should not of itself subject the purchaser to defenses on the
underlying contract. This seems to provide an acceptable solution
insofar as solution turns on the unity or separateness of the two instruments. It ·is believed that the revision can be read this way.
Overreaching this analysis however is the problem of breaking
down the present insulation of the .finance agency from the defaults
of a seller-payee in circumstances where it should be treated as a party
to the original transaction. The direction has been pointed by a lower
court decision in New York in which the court reached this result,
saying:51

"It is common knowledge that, whatever the situation as to
.finance companies was in the past, today they have become de
facto departments of the great automobile businesses, without
which these industries could no more operate than sans their
assembly lines. The .fiction has been permitted to B.ourish that
these .finance companies are foreign and distinct organizations,
a .fiction which no one, however, believes. All sales, when credit
is sought, are approved by these .financial agencies, and future collections are placed immediately in their hands. They have become integrated in the business, part and parcel of the one thing.
"In the smaller industries, which could not afford the organization of separate .finance companies, the same work has been
done by institutions such as the bank plaintiff in this case, who,
in their turn, take over the credit management and collection
of accounts for, and become as integral a part of, the operation
of these smaller enterprises as do the individually-owned .finance
corporations of the greater merchandising companies.
"Looking, without the distortion of ancient notions, at the
picture thus presented, we find the actual control and management of the credit and finance of sellers doing a conditional sale
business in the hands of these finance corporations."
57 Buffalo Ind. Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742 at 744, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (1937),
reversed without passing on the merits, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 568 (1937). To the same general
effect, though with more emphasis on the close relation in the particular case, are Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W. (2d) 260 (1940); Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., (App. D.C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 225; United States v. Schaeffer, (D.C. Md.
1940) 33 F. Supp. 547; Taylor v. Atlas Security Co., 213 Mo. App. 282, 287, 249 S.W.
746 (1923). Cases to the contrary are collected in 128 A.L.R. 729 (1940). The general
problem is discussed in 57 YALE L. J. 1414 (1948).
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Article 3 of the proposed Code does not recognize these factors,
but they may have influenced the provisions of Article 7 on "Secured
Transactions." Under that article the purchaser of the note may assert
the rights of a holder in due course in an action on the note but he
takes subject to defenses on the conditional sale contract or other
security arrangement if he seeks to enforce the security. Moreover,
if he asserts rights as a holder in due course of the note the security
interest "lapses." In effect, where the seller-payee is in default, the
purchaser must make a choice between (a) personal action against
the maker free of the usual defenses and (b) enforcement of the
security, perhaps with a personal claim, subject to the maker's defenses.58 It still remains true, however, that the holder can if he chooses
recover on the note as a holder in due course. If there is to be any
recognition of the factors emphasized by the New York court it will
have to be outside the rather rigid framework of Article 3.

Section 201-Reacquisition. Although the scope of the section is
broader than reacquisition, the most important change is to limit explicitly the area within which one who holds an instrument subject
to defenses or title claims may improve his position by negotiating to
a holder in due course and then repurchasing. Courts and writers
have agreed that it is generally undesirable to permit this;59 and
courts usually have been able to reach the desired end in spite of the
shortcomings of the NIL (section 58). One of the most troublesome
cases is where the payee obtains an instrument by fraud and negotiates
to P who takes with notice of the fraud. If P negotiates to a holder
in due course and then reacquires the instrument, he is entitled under
section 58 to assert his indorser's right to recover free of the defense
unless he was a "party to the fraud." Although it is difficult to :find
that P was a party to the fraud, the few decisions have tended to follow the common law view that P took subject to the defense. 60 After
the revision such holdings can be based on what the statute says for
the "transferee" of the instrument is to get
58 Sections 7-108 and 7-612. This solution is criticized by Kripke, ["The 'Secured Transactions' Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code," 35 VA. L. RBv. 577 at 586 et seq.
(1949)] who argues that negotiability of both note and contract should be recognized.
59 In one situation at least there is no great danger in recognizing that a holder may
improve his position by sale and reacquisition. This is where the holder is a donee who is
unaware of a defense or title defect when he sells. The revision will permit him to stand in
the shoes of the holder in due course from whom he reacquires.
60Berenson v. Conant, 214 Mass. 127, 101 N.E. 60 (1913); Chafee, "The Reacquisition
of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party," 21 CoL. L. RBv. 538 at 542 (1921).
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"such rights as the transferor has therein, except that a transferee
who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting
the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense
or claim against it cannot improve his position by talcing from a
later holder in due course." [Emphasis added]
Section 204-Special Indorsement of Bearer Paper. There is doubt
under the NIL as to whether a special indorsement of bearer paper
prevents further negotiation by delivery. For example, the payee of
a note indorses it in blank and delivers fo Y who indorses "Pay to Z."
The note is stolen from Z, his indorsement is forged, and the instrument is taken by a good faith purchaser. If the purchaser must trace
his title through the forged indorsement he gets none and Z may recover the paper. But the note became bearer paper, negotiable by
delivery alone, when the payee indorsed in blank. If the bearer quality
of the paper continued after the special indorsement to Z, the purchaser can ignore the forged indorsement and if he is a holder in due
course will take free of Z's title claim.
The relevant sections of the NIL look in different directions and
in consequence the law is highly uncertain. 61 The solution of the
problem of statutory interpretation which has found favor with many
writers is that the special indorsement controls when the paper was
theretofore in bearer form only by reason of blank indorsement; but
that it does not control when the paper was originally payable to
bearer. 62 This has the merit of giving some effect to each of two
apparently conflicting sections. No court has adopted the distinction.
Only two courts seem to have passed on the point. Each case involved
order paper which was converted into bearer form by blank indorsement. In each it was held that the paper remained negotiable by
delivery despite a subsequent special indorsement. 63
61 NIL, section 9, says that an instrument is payable to bearer when the "only or last
indorsement is an indorsement in blank." In the situation described in the text .the last indorsement is not in blank. But section 40 says that "where an instrument, payable to bearer,
is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery.•••"
62 McKeehan, "The Negotiable Instruments Law," 50 AM. L. REG. 437, 461 (1902);
Goble, "Effect of a Special lndorsement on a Bearer Instrument,'' 5 ILL. L. REv. 247, 248
(1923); CnAWPoBD, THB NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS I.Aw, 4th ed., 83-84 (1918); BEUTEL's
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS I.Aw, 7th ed., 628 et seq. (1948).
63 Parker v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N.E. 295 (1922); Christian v. California Bank,
(Cal. 1946) 173 P. (2d) 318, affd. on different grounds, 30 Cal. (2d) 421, 182 P. (2d) 554
(1947).
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The present section rejects different treatment of the two situations,, but provides in each that the special indorsement controls.64
Thus, on the facts suggested above, the purchaser would get no title
and the result would be the same if the paper were originally payable
to bearer. The rejection of the suggested distinction seems unfortunate.
The problem has been considered at length by others and all of the
considerations involved will not be repeated. 65 The factor which should
control stems from the rule that a maker who pays one having no
title is not discharged but remains liable to the true owner. The issuer
of bearer paper should not be forced to run the risk of forged indorsements. He engaged to pay" to bearer, not to one holding through a
valid indorsement. Such a risk can fairly be placed, however, on the
maker of order paper since that requires an indorsement for its initial
negotiation.

Section 206-Restrictive Indorsements. This section along with
several sections of the bank collection material deals with what lawyers
now know as restrictive indorsements, a term which has been abandoned in the revision. No attempt will be made to discuss the effect
of the revision upon indorsements for collection. The problems are
closely related to that part of the code on bank collections, which is not
within the scope of this paper. The section also covers the so-called
" trust m
· dorsement," £or examp1e, " pay to T m
· trust f or B." A s to th·1s
indorsement the shortcomings of the NIL are well known. It seems
to say, and has been held to say, that the indorsee, T, cannot be a
holder in due course. 66 Nor has he the power to transfer to another
64 The section provides in part: "Any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable to
the order of the special indorser [sic] and may be further negotiated only by his indorsement."
In Notes to Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947) 49, it is erroneously said: ''In Parker v. Roberts •• .,
the only case dealing with the question, it was held that the indorsement of the special indorsee
was necessary." In the Roberts case, a note payable to order was indorsed in blank by the
payee. This was followed by a special indorsement with no indorsement by the special indorsee. Recovery was granted against the maker, over a challenge to plaintiff's title, the court
saying: ''The right of the plaintiff to omit tracing his title in the declaration through all subsequent indorsers, and to allege that he is the holder under the previous blank indorsement
is conferred by the statute. The note therefore would be transferable by delivery and in effect
a note payable to bearer."
65 See Turner, "A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the Negotiable
Instruments Law," 38 YALE L. J. 1047, 1051 (1929).
66 Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93 (1919). The
relevant sections of the NIL are 36, 37 and 47. They might be interpreted differently but
no court seems to have done so. Smith, "The Concept of 'Negotiability', as used in section
47 of the Negotiable Instrument Law," 7 Tm:. L. REv. 520 (1929).
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the rights of a holder in due course. 67 Nor can he recover against his
indorser as a party secondarily liable. 68 There is no justification for
such treatment of the trustee. He is a purchaser of negotiable paper
and should have the rights of any other purchaser, subject to the limitations imposed upon him as a trustee. Each of these results will be
changed by the revision.

Section 302-Holder in Due Course. The section, reprinted in
full in the footnote, 60 contains several important departures from its
counterpart in the NIL (section 52). The statement that a payee
may be a holder in due course seeks to eliminate the existing difference
of opinion on the point. Although the decisions verbally differ on
this issue, the more important difference is over when a payee is a
holder in due course. The revision takes the position, advocated by
some writers,70 that the tests are the same as for any other holder.
It rejects the elusive distinction which has been suggested between
a payee who takes as purchaser and one who takes as promisee. 71 It
settles in favor of the payee a number of troublesome situations; for
example, where the payee takes from a co-maker who has used the
instrument in breach of his understanding with the other co-maker. 72
Under the revision, the latter cannot assert the misuse as a defense
if the payee meets the usual requirements of holding in due course.
The solution proposed is workable and on the whole is to be preferred.
The third subsection lists some exceptional situations in which
courts have held that the holder· is not a holder in due course
even though he meets the statutory requirements. The interesting
67 The conclusion is virtually inescapable because of the statement in NIL, section 37,
that "all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the first indorsee under the restrictive
indorsement."
68 First Nat. Bank v. John Morrell & Co., 53 S.D. 496, 221 N.W. 95 (1928).
69 "(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
infirmity in it or claim against it on the part of any person.
(2) A payee may be a holder in due course.
(3) The following are not holders in due course: (a) a purchaser at a judicial sale or
any other person who acquires the instrument under legal process; (b) a representative who
acquires the instrument in taking over an estate; (c) one who purchases or otherwise takes
in bulk the assets of a prior holder in a transaction not in the ordinary course of business of
such holder."
70 Feezer, "May the Payee of a Negotiable Instrument be a Holder in Due Course?"
9 Mnm. L. R.Ev. 101 (1925); Britton, "The Payee as a Holder in Due Course," 1 Umv.
Cm. L. REv. 728, 738 (1934).
71 Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course," 36 YALE L. J. 608 (1927).
72 In Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 135 Iowa 350, 112 N.W. 807 (1907), it was held that
the payee was not a holder in due course. Contra: Ex Parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala. 356,
67 s. 839 (1914).
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thing is that they all involve a taking of the instrument which is not
"in due course of business." This idea appeared early in the cases,
as in Mansfield's statement in Peacock 11. Rhodes that the jury ''have
found it [ a bill of exchange] was received in the course of trade, and,
therefore, the case is clear."73 But beyond furnishing a name for the
"holder in due course," the idea found no place in the NIL. Nonetheless, the decisions on which the third subsection is based show that
it still has vitality. Under the revision the problem is likely to arise
as to whether it can be used in the solution of situations not specifically listed. The case of Childs & Co. 11. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank74
provides a good illustration.
Harris by mistake delivered to Childs a package containing $23,000 in bearer bonds which were intended for another. An employee
of Childs wrongfully took the package. Later, when Childs was shipping out bonds for sale, the employee abstracted $23,000 in bonds
from the shipment and substituted the Harris bonds. Childs innocently sold the latter and when Harris sued for conversion, Childs
defended on the ground that it became a holder in due course by
purchasing the Harris bonds with its own bonds. The defense was
rejected, partly on the ground that a holder in due course must take
by negotiation and that there was none. The revision eliminates any
requirement of negotiation, so some other basis will have to be found
to support a good result. 75 One reason why the result seems good is
that this was not a transaction in the ordinary. course of trade. If a
court concludes that this is the unifying principle in the situations
covered by the third subsection, the revision gives it the opportunity
to apply the principle to the Childs situation. In an official comment
to section 1-102, applicable in the construction of the Code as a whole,
it is said:
"This Act adopts the trend of those cases which extend the
principle of a statute either to fill a gap in the language or to
apply to a situation outside of the statute's explicit scope where
reasons and policy justify such extension....
78 Doug. 633 at 636, 99 Eng. Rep. 401 (1781). What this made clear to Mansfield was
that the purchaser of a stolen bill, indorsed in blank, could enforce it free of the defense of
theft. See also Miller v. Race, l Burr. 452 at 458, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 at 402 (1758) in which
Mansfield observed that a lost or stolen instrument "never shall be followed into the hands of
a person who bona fide took it in the course of currency, and in the way of his business.''
74 (C.C.A. 7th, 1928) 27 F. (2d) 633.
75 Perhaps the result could be supported on the theory that Childs did not give value, its
bonds not being a bargained for consideration. See State v. Nebraska State Sav. Bank, 127
Neb. 262, 255 N.W. 52 (1934), noted 33 MrcH. L. REv. 630 (1935).
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"Where situations which are governed in a commercial sense
by a general applicable principle, are covered one by one, any
seemingly restricted language should be expanded to :6.t the reason
and principle of the situation."76

Section 303-Value. The section is as follows:
"A holder takes for value:
(a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that he acquires a contractual lien on the instrument; or
(b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for an antecedent claim against any person whether or not
the claim is due; or
(c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes
an irrevocable commitment to a third person."
Evidently this is intended to continue the present general rule that
"value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." 77
The section also adheres to the view that an antecedent debt is value
and to the majority rule78 that an executory promise, including bank
credit, is not. In earlier drafts it was proposed that the giving of bank
credit ("immediately available checking credit") should be value,79
but this has been abandoned.
In order to decide whether a depositary bank is _a holder in due
course, it will be necessary, as it now is, to determine what constitutes
a withdrawal of deposits. There is a conB:ict in the decisions which
it is clearly desirable to eliminate. The only provision found whiah
bears on the problem is section 612 of the bank collection material,
which reads in its relevant parts as follows:
"(I) To the extent that credit for an item taken as a cash item
[ this includes checks] has been withdrawn or applied to an overdraft, the crediting bank has a lien upon the item or its proceeds ....
. "(4) Fqr the purposes of this section, credits first given shall be
deemed the first to be withdrawn, but credit not available for
76 In discussing the luggage problem under section 103, I made the statement that the
list of permissible clauses which appears in the revision is exhaustive. The quoted statement
suggests otherwise. It seems unlikely, however, that the statement will be of any force in
view of the explicit provision in section 103 that no promise, order, etc. is permissible "except
as authorized by this Article." The Reporter's comments show that he thinks this language
means what it says. Notes to Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947) 6.
77NIL, §25.
78 BR!Tl'oN, BILLS AND NOTEs 394 (1943). For an argument contra see BEUTBL's
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE lNsTRUMBNTS LAw, 7th ed., 498 et seq., 721 et seq. (1948).
79 Tentative Draft No. 3 (1947) §44.
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withdrawal as of right shall be deemed to be used only if necessary to prevent an account from being or continuing to be overdrawn when balances are posted."80
When a check drawn on one bank is deposited with another, this
section treats the depositary bank as an agent for collection with a
lien on the instrument to the extent of withdrawals. The objective
doubtless is to give the bank a value position to the extent of its lien
for the purpose of holding in due course. But the language of section
303 is not happily chosen to accomplish this purpose, since it covers
only a "contractual" lien. Obviously the argument will be made that
the bank's lien is statutory, especially if the bank has not stipulated
for a lien.
The few decisions under the NIL are in conllict on whether withdrawals must be before maturity.81 It would be preferable not to impose this requirement.82 The revision is ambiguous but probably will
be construed to require withdrawals before maturity. Under section
302 a holder in due course must take "without notice that . . . [ the
instrument] is overdue ... or of any infirmity in it." The NIL is
explicit that the holder has a value position only to the extent of withdrawals before notice of an infirmity.83 The revision is unwisely silent
on the point but undoubtedly will be construed to mean what the
NIL says. If so, it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that the
withdrawals also must be before notice that the instrument is overdue.

Section 304-Notice and Good Faith. This section, covering almost
two pages, deals in detail with the important specific problems which
have arisen on the question of notice. Before considering a few of
the detailed provisions, something should be said concerning the general test of notice and the closely related problem of good faith. The
language on these questions may create serious uncertainties.
1. In 1824, in Gill v. Cubit, 84 the King's Bench approved an
instruction to find whether the purchaser took the instrument "under
80 The first clause of the second subsection follows the prevailing "first in-first out'' rule.
BEtJTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE lNsTRU:MENTS LAw, 7th ed., 506 (1948). The final
clause apparently is intended to reject application of this rule as between a cash deposit and
the usual credit given on deposit of a check for collection.
81 It was held that withdrawals must be before maturity in Central Savings Bank & Trust
Co. v. Stotter, 207 Mich. 329, 174 N.W. 142 (1919). Contra: National Bank of Commerce
v. Armbruster, 42 Okla. 656, 142 P. 393 (1914).
82 The arguments 'against the requirement were forcefully stated by Brewer in Fox v.
Bank of Kansas City, 30 Kan. 441 at 447 (1883).
83 Section 54.
84 3 Barn. & Cress. 466 at 467, 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (1824).
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circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent
and careful man." Twelve years later, in Goodman v. Harvey, 85 the
King's Bench condemned this instruction with the statement that
"where the bill has passed to the plaintiff without any proof of bad
faith in him, there is no objection to his title."· This test, that good
faith means simply absence of bad faith, gained currency in this
country and was adopted by the NIL. It is generally said that Goodman v. Harvey simply reinstated the rule of the law merchant which
had prevailed until 1824.86 It is generally said also that the test is
subjective, the absence of actual bad faith. 87
Actually the courts have been searching since the early cases for
an objective standard. During the formative period the English judges,
especially Mansfield, apparently thought of good faith in connection
with taking "in due course of trade."88 Surely this was a search for
an external standard. More recently the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that a man does not take in good faith if he has
"knowledge of some truth that would prevent action by those commercially honest men for whom law is made."89 This development
is to be expected and it seems wise to give it explicit recognition in the
statute. It is to be expected because of the necessity of judging a
man's state of mind by observable facts. It seems wise because the
law's need for generalized treatment justifies limiting the extraordinary
protection given a holder in due course to one who measures up to the
usual conduct of honest men.
The revisers' definition of good faith appears in the general definitions section, applicable to the whole Commercial Code, as follows:
" 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties
and observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in which he is engaged."
85 4 Adol. & El.
86 BENJAMIN's

870 at 876, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836).
BrLLs, NoTEs AND Cmicxs, 2d Am. ed., 102 (1889);
Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 343 at 368 (1857).
87 Thus, in the Commissioners' Notes to Section 1 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, it is
said: "The NIL uses the term 'bad faith,' but does not define it. The courts have held, however, that the test of good faith is the subjective test of honesty, and not the objective test of
due care."
88 Supra, note 73.
89 Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1924) 3 F. (2d) 236 at
238. See also Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E. (2d) 146 (1938) (''bad faith in a
commercial sense"); Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 137 A. 113 (1927) ("commercial bad
faith"). (Italics added).
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The first sentence follows Goodman v. Harvey and the NIL. The
second sentence adopts an objective standard, applicable however only
to one engaged in trade or business. A trade or business presumably
has standards of honest conduct and standards of prudent conduct.
Which set of standards is to be used is not clear. In the context a
court probably will read the words to mean standards of honest conduct, the "commercially honest man" test.
But most situations raising an issue of good faith also can be viewed
as raising an issue of notice. The general test of notice given in
section 304 is "that upon all the facts and circumstances known to
the purchaser he has reasonable grounds to believe that there is an
infirmity in the instrument or a claim against it or that it is overdue
or dishonored." In operation this may take us almost back to the
prudent man approach. Certainly it is quite different from the statement in NIL, section 56: "knowledge of such facts that his action
in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith." Nor is it the same
test as that found in the good faith definition, if the definition means
"commercial honesty." There should be a single standard, whether
the issue is good faith or notice.
2. A troublesome problem under the NIL may be stated in this
general form: If a purchaser is on notice of an infirmity or title defect,
is he denied the rights of a holder in due course even though the
defense asserted is unrelated to such infirmity or title defect? Thus
the payee of a note who held as a fiduciary for X negotiated the note
in breach of trust to a holder with notice of the breach. Can the
maker defend the holder's action on the ground of failure of consideration? If the maker has no defense going to his ultimate liability it is probable that he can not assert X's title claim to defeat the
action.90 But this does not settle the question whether he can use
the transaction between the payee and the plaintiff to show that the
latter is not a holder in due course and therefore holds subject to
the maker's defense of failure of consideration. As a matter of language it seems reasonably clear under the NIL that he may do so
and there is some supporting authority. 91 But there is authority to
the contrary, which one writer relies upon as enunciating the "general
90 See note 97, infra.
91 Nat. Bank of Commerce

of Detroit v. Marr & Co., 254 Mich. 333, 237 N.W. 56
(1931); Walker v. Bartlesville State Bank, 91 Okla. 231, 216 P. 928 (1923); Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 137 A. 113 (1927).
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rule." 92 The revision is no better and no worse than the NIL in its
treatment of the question. It points to the conclusion that the defense
asserted may be quite unrelated to the infirmity or title defect of which
the purchaser has notice. In view of the present difference of opinion,
however, a more explicit provision seems advisable.
3. Under the NIL, where paper is issued with blanks and thereafter is completed in excess of authority, a holder in due course may
recover on the instrument as completed. If the purchaser knows when
he buys that blanks have been filled, there is considerable uncertainty
as to whether he is a holder in due course.93 It is proposed to so treat
him, so that in effect he is entitled to assume that the authority to
fill has been properly exercised. The choice is a difficult one and a
fairly arbitrary one, as is true in- many instances in which one of two
innocent persons must bear a loss caused by the wrongdoing of a third
person. Perhaps the Reporter has selected what should be the controlling factor when he argues that anyone so "foolish as to set a
blank instrument in circulation" ought to take the consequences;94
though the foolishness often seems to consist of what may be an
uncommon faith in the integrity of others. In any event, the argument does not apply to one situation. As we have seen, the revision
will change present law by providing that a holder in due course
takes free of the defense of non-delivery of an incomplete instrument95
It may happen that a purchaser will take without notice of the nondelivery but with notice of the fact that blanks were filled. Under
the revision he will be protected, a result which certainly cannot be
justified on the ground that the maker has put blank paper in circulation. The purchaser is getting greater protection than he should.

Sections 305 and 306-Defenses and Title Claims. Section 305,
covering generally the rights of a holder in due course, enumerates
the so-called real defenses. In the main, existing real defenses are
codified. If the section is open to criticism it is because the enumeration is in terms exhaustive. A holder in due course, it is said, takes
the instrument free from all defenses except those listed. If this can
be viewed as "seemingly restricted language," perhaps a court will
92 Bru:rroN, BILLS AND NoTEs 488 (1943). The only case cited by Professor Britton
which actually supports his position is Baird v. Lorenz, 57 N.D. 804, 224 N.W. 206 (1929).

93 BEUTEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

BILLS AND NOTES 337 (1943).
94 Notes to Tentative Draft No. 3 (1947) 64.
95 See discussion under §106.

LAw, 7th ed., 353 (1948); BRIT.rON,
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feel free to follow the admonition already mentioned to "expand"
such language to fit the "reason and principle of the situation."96
The rights of one not a holder in due course are treated in section
306. One significant provision concerns the question of the jus tertii,
that is, the attempt to defend on the ground that a third person has
better title to the instrument than the plaintiff. It limits the defense
to the single case of theft, which is probably a statement of present
law with the possible exception of the finder situation.97 This means
that the defendant can defeat the action if the instrument was stolen
and the plaintiff is not a holder in due course. If the plaintiff is a
holder in due course the title claim of the third person would not
succeed in any event,98 and it cannot therefore be asserted by the
defendant. For all other cases it is provided that "the claim of any
third person to the instrument is not ... available as a defense to
any party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the
action for such party." Although there is a slight possibility of confusion, it is reasonably clear that this language does not apply to forged
indorsements. That is, where the maker of a note is sued he can defeat
recovery on the ground that the plaintiff must trace his title through
an indorsement which is forged. Arguably this is defending by proof
that title is in a third person, but the revision does not treat this as a
"defense." Proof of the genuineness of the indorsement is a part of
the plaintiff's case.99
1111 But cf.

note 76, supra.
the case of a lost instrument writers have differed on whether the loss can be
asserted as a defense in an action by the finder. Aigler takes the position that the defense may
be asserted • .AIOI.ER, CAS:as ON BII..I.S AND NOT:Bs 643 (1947). Chafee argued for the contrary
position [BRANNAN's, NEGOTIABLE INs'l'RUMBNTS LAw, 4th ed., 544 (1926)] and the argument is adopted in B:aOT:BL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INsTRuMBNTs LAw, 7th ed., at p. 889
(1948). The case which has appeared in the reports most frequently involves a title which
is defective because of fraud or negotiation in breach of trust. For example, X obtained a note
from the payee by fraudulent representations and negotiated it to P. In an action by P against
the maker there was good common law authority that the maker could not defeat recovery by
asserting the payee's title claim, even though P was not a holder in due course. Prouty v.
Roberts, 60 Mass. 19 (1850) (fraud); Kinney v. Kruse, 28 Wis. 183 (1871) (breach of
trust). The same conclusion was reached under the NIL in Bowles v. Oakman, 246 Mich.
674, 225 N.W. 613 (1929) (breach of trust), though without citing the statute. As to theft,
it was taken for granted from an early date that the maker could raise the issue. Peacock v.
Rhodes, 2 Doug. 633, 99 Eng. Rep. 40 (1781); Gill v. Cubit, 3 Barn. & Cress. 446, 107 Eng.
Rep. 806 (1824).
98 Of course this statement slides over the fact that decision on the holding in due course
issue will not be res judicata in a subsequent action by the third person.
99 The analysis and result are the same under the NIL. BRI'lToN, BILLS AND NOT:Bs
749 (1943).
97 In
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Section 306 rejects the holding of Justice v. Stonecipher1° 0 and
similar cases, that good faith purchase after maturity cuts off the
title claim of a prior holder who voluntarily intrusted another with
the instrument and claims that it was negotiated in breach of trust.
Under the revision the claim can be effectively asserted against any
purchaser who is not a holder in due course. The fact that an instrument has not been paid at maturity suggests that the obligor may
have asserted a defense. This probably explains the formulation of
the rule that only a purchaser before maturity took free of defensesoverdueness put a purchaser on notice of possible defenses. On the
Stonecipher issue, perhaps the critical inquiry should be whether overdueness also suggests the possibility of title defects.101 Any answer
is speculative but there is enough reason to believe that it does to
warrant rejection of the Stonecipher position.102 The favored position
of the holder in due course is better limited in this situation to one
who is a holder in due course.

Section 404-Fictitious Payees and Impostors. 103 This is a :6.rstrate achievement. It should go a long way to eliminate the existing
necessity of drawing :6.ne distinctions which ought to make no difference.
1. The NIL does not deal with the impostor situation as a separate problem. This has made it necessary to reach a solution, formally
100 267 ill. 448, 108 N.E. 722 (1915). The authorities are divided. BBUTEL's BRANNAN, NncoTIABLB lNsTRUMBN"rs LAw, 7th ed., 844 et seq. (1944).
101 " ••• the mere fact that the note is overdue does not ••• put a purchaser upon inquiry
any more than a purchaser is bound in ~my other case to inquire into the title of his vendor."
Gardner v. Beacon Trust Co., 190 Mass. 27 at 30, 76 N.E. 455 (1906). Accord: Chafee,
''Rights in Overdue Paper," 31 HARv. L. REv. 1104 at 1126 (1918).
102 " ••• inquiry among banks has indicated that the overdue promissory note and the
stale check are suspect; that they do not circulate, and almost never are taken without inquiry.•.••" Notes to Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947) 70. Compare this statement with the
proposal to protect a drawee bank which pays a stale check, discussed infra under section
414.
103 The section provides:
"(I) With respect to a holder in due course or a person paying the instrument in good
faith an indorsement is effective when made in the name of the specified payee by any of the
following persons, or their agents or confederates:
(a) an impostor who through the mails or otherwise has induced the maker or drawer to
issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the payee;
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer who intends the payee to have no
interest in the instrument;
(c) an agent or employee of the drawer who has supplied him with the name of the
payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liability of the person so
indorsing."
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at least, by discovery of the maker's or drawer's intent. When a check
is made payable in the name X and is delivered to Y who represented
himself to be X, did the drawer intend X or Y as the payee? Even if
it is possible to answer the question at all, it must be recognized that
the answer is not easy. The generally accepted approach is to seek
the drawer's "dominant intent" and the generally accepted hypothesis
is that his primary intent was to make the check payable to the one
with whom he dealt, that is, the impostor.104 At least this is true where
he dealt face to face with the impostor; there is more doubt if the
dealings were by mail.1° 5 The revision eliminates any distinction
between dealings by mail and face to face. It will change the law in
those states which have not accepted the general rule just stated.106
In the whole range of cases it will make effective, in favor of a holder
in due course or good faith payor, the impostor's signature in the name
of the specified payee. The applicable language provides for such
effectiveness when the indorsement is made by "the following persons,
or their agents or confederates: (a) an impostor who through the
mails or otherwise has induced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to him or his confederate in the name of the payee...."
Despite general acceptance of the dominant intent approach, it
still is necessary in many situations to weigh the precise facts in the
attempt to discover this intent. Where, for example, the face to face
contact of the drawer and impostor was fleeting, it has been held that
the impostor's indorsement was ineffective.107 If the result ought to
be different in such case from what it is when the contact is more
substantial, perhaps the uncertainty which we now have is warranted.
The difference in result is justifiable once we accept the basic approach in terms of intent; so that the inquiry becomes whether this
104 Montgomery Garage Co. v. Manufacturer's Liab. Ins. Co., 94 N.J.L. 152, 109 A.
296 (1920); BmrrEL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE lNsTRUMENTs LAw, 7th ed., 470,476 (1948).
105 In cases involving passage of title on a sale of goods this distinction is usually made.
Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917); VoLD, SALES 375 (1931). Abel
concludes from his study that the distinction has not been observed in the negotiable instruments cases. Abel, "The Impostor Payee; or, Rhode Island Was Right," 1940 W1s. L. REv.
161 at 173. However, there are several decisions, holding that the intended payee was not
the impostor, which are best explained by the fact that the dealings were by mail. Rossi v.
National Bank of Commerce, 71 Mo. App. 150 (1897); Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Silverman,
148 A.D. 1, 132 N.Y.S. 1017 (1911); American Surety Co. v. Empire Trust Co., 262 N.Y.
181, 186 N.E. 436 (1933).
106 The leading case for the position that the indorsernent is a forgery is Tolman v.
American Nat. Bank, 22 R.I. 462, 48 A. 480 (1901).
1o1 Simpson v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 43 Utah 105, 134 P. 883 (1913).
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approach furnishes an acceptable basis for decision. It is believed
that it does not.
We start with the legal fact that a forged indorsement is ineffective
to pass title. In many instances this leads almost inescapably to solution by looking for intent. If a check payable to John Smith can be
effectively ~dorsed by any person of that name, the rule concerning
forged indorsements begins to look ridiculous. There is good reason for
the general position that there is only one payee and he is the John
Smith whom the drawer had in mind.108 However, the practical necessity for inquiry into intent in this case does not mean that intent
needs to control in all cases involving the effectiveness of an indorsement. The impostor case is a recurring type situation, varying in
detail but highlighted by the fact that a person, usually a drawer, has
been hoodwinked by a scoundrel. Broadly, the law must decide
whether the resulting loss should be borne by the drawer on the one
hand or a good faith purchaser or payor on the other. If the drawer
has been negligent it is possible to burden him with the loss on an
estoppel theory.109 The intent analysis would make sense if the drawer's
carefulness were even roughly measured by the extent of his dealings with the impostor; if it could be said, that is, that the more extensive his dealings are with the impostor, the more careless he is in
being taken in. Such a correlation is not obvious and in fact just
as good a case could be made for the converse proposition. On the
whole it seems preferable in all cases to place the loss on the drawer
who, in; the words of the revision, "allowed himself to be tricked."110
The revision applies only when the impostor indorses in the payee's
name, and this is the sort of case which usually gets into the books.
But in one of the important cases on the subject the impostor obtained
the special indorsement of a check which he then indorsed in the
name of the special indorsee.111 On the issue as to the effectiveness
of the indorsement, the court rightly assumed that there was no significant difference between indorsement in the name of a specified in108 A bill payable to "Henry Davis" got into the hands of another Henry Davis than the
one intended by the drawer. His indorsement of his own name was held to be ineffective to
pass title. Mead v. Young, 4 T.R. 28, 100 Eng. Rep. 876 (1790).
109 The effect of negligence is discussed by Abel, "The Impostor Payee; or, Rhode Island
was Right," 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161 at 187 et seq.
110 Official comment to §404.
111 Cohen v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 275 N.Y. 399, 10 N.E. (2d) 457 (1937).
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dorsee and one in the name of a specified payee. The case is not
covered by the present section but could be decided by analogy.112
2. The method of handling the fictitious payee case is a contribution to clarity of thinking on the subject. It is treated as presenting essentially the same problem as the impostor situation; that is,
the effectiveness of an indorsement by one who is in some measure
responsible for the naming of the fictitious payee. Accordingly, paper
payable to a fictitious payee is not to be bearer paper, as it is under
NIL section 9, when "such fact was known to the person making
it so payable." It is to be order paper, but with respect to a holder
in due course or a good faith payor certain persons can effectively
indorse.
In the main the results will be no different than at present, but
one important change is proposed. An employee pads his employer's
payroll and secures checks drawn by the employer payable to persons
whom the employee does not intend shall have any interest therein. He
indorses the checks in the name of the fictitious payee and either negotiates or obtains payment from the drawee. It is generally agreed
under the NIL that the knowledge of the employee is not that of
"the person making [ the check] so payable." Hence, the checks are
not payable to bearer, the indorsements are ineffective and neither
the purchaser nor the paying drawee is protected.113 This will be
changed by the provision that "an indorsement is effective" when
made by "an agent or employee of the drawer who has supplied him
with the name of the payee intending the latter to have no ... [interest in the instrument]." A few states already have amended the
NIL along the same lines. 114
The provision just quoted applies only where the check is indorsed.
A drawee might pay the wrongdoer without indorsement though of
course this is unusual. Under the NIL, if section 9 applied to make
the check payable to bearer, the drawee would be protected if it paid
in good faith. The result under the revision is uncertain. Similarly,
the language covering impostors applies only where there is an indorsement. Today, if the court concludes that the intended payee
112 It is a good instance for extension of the principle of the statute "to apply to a situation outside of the statute's explicit scope where reason and policy justify such extension."
Supra, note 76.
113 American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W. (2d)
1034 (1932); Kessler, "Forged Indorsements," 47 YALE L. J. 863 at 887 (1938).
114 See citations to statutes in 2 PATON's D1GBST 1867 (1942).
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is the impostor, the paying drawee will be protected by a good faith
payment to the impostor without an indorsement. An indorsement
is not necessary so long as the drawee in fact pays the holder. 115 Again,
the result under the revision is uncertain. Each case should be decided
by analogy to the present section.
·

Section 408-Consideration. The record of changes in this section
suggests that the necessity of consideration has been one of the most
controversial problems presented to the revisers. The Reporter
originally proposed that the requirement of consideration be completely eliminated.110 The next stage was a proposal that no consideration be required for (a) an acceptance, (b) any obligation given
in payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation, or (c) a
check intended as a gift.117 The check proposal was then abandoned,
with a new proposal made that no consideration be required for any
instrument given as a charitable subscription.118 In the latest draft
this has been eliminated along with the proposal relating to an acceptance. In substance, no changes are to be made in present law except
as embodied in the statement that " [ n] o consideration is necessary for
an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or as security
for an antecedent obligation of any kind."
This should eliminate an existing confusion in suretyship cases.
If A, being indebted to B, gives B his note to pay or secure the debt,
it is generally agreed that there is consideration for the note. 119 If
A, being indebted to B on a note, induces C gratuitously to give his
(C's) _note to B to secure A's debt, the courts disagree on whether
C's promise is supported by consideration.120 If A, being indebted
to B on a note, induces C gratuitously to indorse the note after delivery to B, the courts are generally agreed that C's promise is not
binding for want of consideration.121 It seems preferable to treat the
v. Murchison Nat. Bank, 196 N.C. 233, 745 S.E. 241 (1928).
Draft No. 1 (1946) §16.
117 Tentative Draft No. 3 (1947) §19.
118 Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1948) §501.
119 This represents general understanding but it is difficult to find satisfactory case authority. See comment, 46 MlcH. L. RBv. 211 (1947).
120 West Rutland Trust Co. v Houston, 104 Vt. 204, 158 A. 69 (1932) (consideration);
Kiess v. Baldwin (App. D.C. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 470 (no consideration).
121Bank of Carrollton v. Latting, 37 Okla. 8, 130 P. 144 (1913); BIU'lToN, BILLS AND
NOTES 377 (1943). Otherwise, if the surety signed pursuant to a prior understanding.
115 Bell

116 Tentative

1950]

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

289

surety cases alike and to hold that C is bound in each instance. This
is what the revision proposes to do.122
It is unfortunate that the section does nothing to remedy the
unsatisfactory situation as to acceptance. It means that courts and
lawyers will continue to waste time trying to fit a number of ordinary
acceptance situations into contracts notions of consideration.123 The
present general understanding should at least be recognized: On the
issue of consideration, an acceptor is bound to a holder for value
whether the value was given before, at the time of, or after, the
acceptance, that is, regardless of whether it was ''bargained for and
given in exchange for the promise."124 It is true, however, that the
need for such recognition is lessened by the provision that a payee
may be a holder in due course.

Sections 410 and 411-Acceptance and Certification. It is proposed to eliminate virtual, extrinsic and constructive acceptances, following the scheme of the English Bills of Exchange Act. The proposal appears desirable; somewhat greater simplicity will be achieved
without the loss of any needed legal devices.125 As to constructive
acceptances, the tendency of the decisions under the NIL has been to
treat a mere failure to return a check within the prescribed time as an
acceptance, even though the check was presented for payment rather
than acceptance.126 This has been done without much regard to the
language of the statute, but has had the desirable effect of forcing
the drawee to act promptly so that the holder knows where he stands.
Although somewhat ambiguous, the revision apparently intends to
122 At least this is what is intended and will be accomplished if §408 is found controlling.
But in an attempt in §424 to button up this solution the draftsman uses too many buttons.
That section provides in part that "[w]hen the instrument has been taken for consideration
before it is due ••• [an accommodation party] is liable in the capacity in which he signed••••"
Suppose the note in the third case was given by A to B for a prior obligation. Sec. 408 does
not treat this as consideration but binds A without consideration. When C signs as surety
after delivery to B, he is liable under §424 if the instrument was "taken for consideration."
Was it, under §408?
123 Considerable ingenuity has been exercised, as in Commercial Bank of Lake Erie v.
Norton and Fox, 1 Hill (N.Y.) 501 (1841), where consideration for acceptance of a time
bill was found in the holder's forbearance of immediate recourse against the drawer, which
he would have had in the event of dishonor by non-acceptance.
124 The quotation is from the CoNTRACTs REsTATBMENT §75 (1932). On the negotiable instruments aspect, see comment, 36 YALE L. J. 245 at 251 (1926).
125 Letters of credit are covered in a separate article of the Code.
12 6 Wisner v. First Nat. Bank of Gallitzin, 220 Pa. 21, 68 A. 955 (1908); BEUT.BL's
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE lNsTRUMENTS LAw, 7th ed., 1249 (1948).
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treat a failure to pay within the prescribed period as a dishonor.127
This should adequately accomplish the same purpose.
Section 411 provides that certification of a check "discharges the
drawer and indorsers from all prior liability on the check." This is
the ~£feet under the NIL when certification is at the request of the
holder but not when it is requested by the drawer.128 The official
comment makes it clear that this distinction is to be eliminated and
the drawer is to be "discharged" in either case. The language of the
section is rather awkward, however. A check certified at the request
of the drawer usually is certified before delivery, that is before the
drawer has assumed any "prior liability" of which he can be "discharged." The real meaning of the section in this common situation
is that the drawer never becomes obligated on an instrument which
he signs and delivers. This is a bit startling. One justification given
in the official comment is that certified checks "are normally taken
on the credit of the bank alone." It would be difficult either to prove
or disprove the statement. Certification before delivery usually is
obtained because the payee is not satisfied to take the drawer's obligation alone. It does not follow that he intends to dispense with the
drawer's obligation. The check is formally issued as two name paper
and it seems likely that the payee takes with that understanding.

Section 414-Contract between Drawer and Drawee. The NIL
scarcely touches on the relation between drawer and drawee, an omission which the revisers are proposing to remedy. The general objective
is to cover those situations which arise in connection with negotiable
instruments. The general effect is to put the drawee who pays in good
faith in the same relative position as a holder in due course. We have
seen this done already, under section 404, in the :fictitious payee and
impostor situations. The present section does the same thing, for
example, in the case of incomplete instruments. The drawee may
127 Sec. 507 says in part that "payment of an instrument may be deferred without dishonor pending reasonable examination to determine whether it is properly payable, but payment must be made in any event before the close of business on the day of presentment.•.•"
This fairly implies that longer inaction constitutes dishonor. Sec. 508 provides in part that
"an instrument is dishonored when ••• presentment is duly made and due acceptance or payment is refused or cannot be obtained••••" Unless the words "cannot be obtained" are read to
mean "is not obtained" the inference just made from §507 is not warranted.
128 NIL, §188; Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187 N.E. 94 (1933). The distinction was formulated before the NIL; see Minot v. Russ, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N.E. 489 (1892).
It was criticized at the time in Jones, "The Liability of the Maker of a Check after Certification," 6 HARv. L. REv. 138 (1892). The arguments made by Jones against the distinction
were much the same as those found in the official comment to §411.
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charge the drawer's account "according to the tenor of a completed
instrument," even though it was completed in excess of authority and
apparently even though it was stolen in incomplete form. 129
In one respect the revision shows considerably more solicitude for
the paying drawee than for the purchaser. By section 304 a check
is to be regarded generally as overdue when it has been outstanding
more than thirty days. A purchaser thereafter will not be a holder in
due course. But it seems that the drawee will be able to make payment in due course, so that it can charge the drawer's account, regardless of the length of time the check has been outstanding. Subsection
(7) provides:
''The undertaking of a bank to pay a check is limited to a period
of six months after its date unless its terms extend the period. In
the absence of an effective stop order the bank may thereafter
pay the check at its option."
The first sentence is the substance of a statute which has been adopted
in many states, although the usual period is one year.130 It permits
a drawee bank to dishonor a stale check without incurring liability
to ii$ depositor. The second sentence is new and apparently authorizes the bank to pay and charge its depositor's account regardless of
how stale the check is. It gives protection to banks which even the
American Bankers Association has not asked for, at least prior to the
undertaking of the revision.131
In explanation of the adoption of the six-month period, the Reporter's Notes state: 132
"The shorter time limit of six months is adopted here because
the bankers at the Cleveland meeting were all agreed in the
belief that any check outstanding for more than six months is
120 The latter conclusion is stated with some hesitation for the section is ambiguous.
130 The Reporter's notes state that one year is used in fifteen jurisdictions, six months

in
eleven jurisdictions. Notes to Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1948) 21. The Michigan statute
reads:
"Where a check or other instrument payable on demand at any bank or trust
company doing business in this state is presented for payment more than one [1]
year from its date, such bank or trust company may, unless expressly instructed by
the drawer or maker to pay the same, refuse payment thereof and no liability shall
thereby be incurred to the drawer or maker for dishonoring the instrument by nonpayment." Mich. Stat. Ann. (1943) §23.401; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §12077.
This is identical with the form recommended by the American Bankers Association. 1
PATON'S DIGEST 1110 (1940).
131 See the statute quoted in note 130.
132 Notes to Proposed Final Draft No. I (1948) 22.
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open to suspicion; that a bank will not pay it without consulting
the depositor, and that it should not be required to do so." [Emphasis added]
Yet it is proposed to free the bank of liability for payment of a check
which is "open to suspicion," unless there is an effective stop payment
order. In order for a stop payment order to be effective under the
revision renewal in writing will be required every six months.rn 3
There is merit in placing responsibility on the drawer to give a stop
payment order if he wishes to prevent payment during the period
within which payment reasonably can be made. There is little justification for placing on him the burden of renewals during an indefinite
period in order to protect himself against payment which is not in due
course.134

Section 418-Drawer's Duty to Drawee as to Forged Instruments.
This section provides in full:

"(I) Where a bank sends to its customer a statement of
account accompanied by instruments paid in good faith which
support the debit entries, or sends notice to him that such a statement is ready for delivery
(a) the customer must exercise reasonable care to examine
the statement and instruments to discover his unauthorized signature or any alteration and to notify the bank
thereof, and is liable to the bank for any loss resulting
from his failure to do so; and
(b) subject to subsection (2) a customer who does not within
ninety days discover and report his unauthorized signature or any alteration on an_y such instrument is precluded
from asserting against the bank such unauthorized signature or alteration and any unauthorized signature or alteration by the same person on any instrument subsequently paid by the bank.
(2) A customer unable for good cause to examine such statement and instruments may within thirty days after such inability
ceases demand recredit or repayment for material alteration or
his unauthorized signature."
133 This

is contained in §415.
there is not much authority, the drawee probably takes the risk of payment
after a check has been outstanding an unreasonably long time. If the drawer had a defense
which could have been asserted against the holder, his account may not be charged. The
Lancaster Bank v. Woodward, 18 Pa. 357 (1852); 1 PATON'S Th:GEST 1107-8 (1940).
134 Although
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A better understanding of its provisions will be gained by considering first the effects of section 407, which provides:
"Any person who by his negligence contributes to material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of authority
against a holder in due course or a drawee who pays the instrument in good faith."
When a carefully drawn check is fraudulently raised and paid in the
raised amount by the drawee, the latter can charge the drawer's account only for the original amount. This has been settled for a long
time and will be true under the revision. The risk of loss from payment of an altered (or forged) check has become a banker's risk.
If the drawer negligently leaves blank spaces which facilitate the
alteration of the check, it has been felt that, as against the drawee,
he should bear the loss caused by his negligence. The loss is the
raised amount, laying aside the possibility of recovery from the
forger or some other party. It seems fair to hold that the drawee
can charge the drawer's account in the raised amount, thereby placing on the drawer the burden of obtaining satisfaction from the
forger. Generally this is what the courts have done. 135 It is the effect
of section 407 with its provision that the drawer is "precluded from
asserting the alteration."
The same facts may raise a controversy between the drawer and
a holder in due course, as where the alteration is discovered before
payment, payment is refused, and the holder sues the drawer. Absent
negligence of the drawer, the holder's position is the same as that of
the paying drawee. The alteration is a real defense so that his recovery
is limited to the original amount of the check. This is left unchanged
by the revision. If the drawer has been negligent in drawing the check
courts have differed on whether this affects his liability to the holder.
Some hold that it does, that the drawer is in effect precluded from
asserting the alteration. 136 Perhaps a majority have on one theory or
another held that the negligence is irnrnaterial.137 The reasons given
could also be used to demonstrate immateriality of the negligence
when the issue is between drawer and drawee, if the court were so
1s11 Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (1827); Timbel v. Garfield Nat.
Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N.Y.S. 497 (1907).
186 Hackett v. First Nat. Bank of Louisville, 114 Ky. 193, 70 S.W. 664 (1902).
187 Nat. Exchange Bank of Albany v. Lester, 194 N.Y. 461, 87 N.E. 779 (1909);
BRITroN, BILLs AND NOTBs 1069 (1943).
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minded: that the drawer owed no duty to prospective purchasers to
use care in issuing his checks;138 or that his lack of care was not the
proximate cause of the loss because of the intervening criminal act
of a third person.139 The distinction between holder and drawee is
better rejected, which is what the revision does in section 407.
Turning to section 418, only the legal relations of drawer and
drawee are included. Subsection I (a) covers situations in which the
drawer is negligent, but the negligence is after alteration and payment
in the altered amount, rather than before the alteration as in the situation just considered. Negligence after alteration and payment can
harm the bank only if the drawer's delay in discovering or reporting
the alteration prejudices the bank's recovery from another party, particularly the forger. Courts have differed, some holding that the
drawee must bear the loss except to the extent that the negligence
actually caused a loss,1 40 others holding that the drawer is precluded
from asserting the alteration.141 The effect of the second view is that
a banker's risk is shifted to the depositor because of his negligence
without regard to whether this negligence actually affected the situation; or, as sometimes qualified, some loss to the bank must appear
but once it does the drawer is estopped irrespective of the extent oP
loss.142 Considering the difficulties of proof, this would be acceptable
if in general there were a reasonably high probability that the delay
prevented full or substantially full recovery from the forger. Common
experience suggests otherwise. In this aspect the revisers have wisely
chosen the "negligence" instead of the "estoppel" theory.
Subsection I (b) is based upon a provision which has had the
backing of the American Bankers Association and has been enacted
with some variations in approximately two-thirds of the states.143 The
bankers, however, have asked only for a six-month limitation; this
gives them ninety days. The subsection requires no showing of negligence in the particular case. After ninety days without a report of
the alteration, the loss is borne by the drawer. It is an exceedingly
short statute of limitations, directed, however, at the giving of notice
13s Nat. Exchange Bank of Albany v. Lester, 194 N.Y. 461, 87 N.E. 779 (1909).
139 Sav. Bank of Richmond v. Nat. Bank of Goldsboro, (C.C.A. 4th, 1925) 3 F. (2d)
970.
140 Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902); BRITI'oN, BILLS
NoTEs 601 (1943).
141Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96 (1886); Arant, "Forged
Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to His Bank,'' 31 YAU L. J. 598 at 612 et seq. (1922).
142 Arant, supra note 141, at 616.
143 2 PATON'S DIGEST 1882-3 (1942).
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rather than the commencement of an action. One reason given for
the provision is that such a delay is "clearly negligent" and that the bank
after such a lapse of time has little chance of recovery from the forger.
There is little reason to quarrel with either statement; they are valid
generalizations for statutory purposes. But the important point is~
would earlier discovery, in general, have led to full or substantially
full recovery from the forger? As suggested above, there is insufficient
reason to believe that it would. Insofar as the second subsection rests
on assumed negligence, the considerations are the same as those which
enter into the framing of the first subsection. Yet the revisers are
adopting the estoppel theory here after having rejected it in the first
subsection.
The other reason given is the desirability of "terminating bank
transactions after a relatively short period."144 This value is significant
but not sufficiently so to justify shifting the bank's loss to the depositor
after such a short period. Recovery of a money judgment is unsettling
to most defendants. It is difficult to believe that the banking business
is so different from other businesses as to require a ninety-day statute
of limitations.145

Section 420-Finality of Payment or Acceptance. This section
covers Price v. Nea'f!- 46 and related problems, stating the general
position that "payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor
of a holder in due course, and so far as concerns direction to stop
payment or the sufficiency of the drawer's account is final in favor
of any holder."
The common law rule of Price v. Neal was generally understood
to be that a drawee who accepted or paid a check or other bill on
which the drawer's signature was forged was bound on the acceptance
and could not recover the payment. This was adopted by NIL section
62 with respect to acceptance but the statute is silent as to payment.
On one theory or another nearly all courts have continued to recognize
finality of payment.147 The proposed section will eliminate the need
1-14 The

reasons discussed in the text appear in the official comment to §418.
description of the ninety-day period was not originated by the writer; the official
comment to the section describes it as a "short statute of limitations."
146 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
147 According to the Wisconsin court, NIL §62 covers payment because "payment
plainly constitutes an acceptance." Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304,
227 N.W. 387 (1929). According to the Massachusetts court, NIL §62 does not cover the
case nor does any other part of the statute, hence the case is to be decided on common law
authority. South Boston Tr. Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 143 N.E. 816 (1924).
145 This
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for further judicial gymnastics by its explicit inclusion of payment.
It is commonly said148 that finality of acceptance or payment
operates only in favor of a holder in due course, a view which has
been vigorously assailed by some writers. 149 After rejection in earlier
drafts,1 50 the latest draft has adopted this view. The holding in due
course concept was developed for another purpose and is inapt here
at least as applied to payment. Its use means, for example, that results
may differ depending upon whether the holder of a check who has
received payment took before or after maturity, which usually will
be thirty days after issuance under the revision.151 Purchase after
maturity has a rational bearing on the holder's right to recover free
of prior defenses, but it should be irrelevant to the question whether
payment is final.1 52
The record reveals an interesting change of position on the group
of problems raised by Wells Fargo Bank, etc. v. Bank of Italy.153 In
that case a check payable to Albert Meyer & Co. was fraudulently
altered by some unknown person by erasing the payee's name and
substituting the name Behling. It was then certified by the drawee,
presumably at the request of the same unknown person; indorsed in
the name of Behling, also presumably by the same unknown person;
and cashed by the Bank of Italy. The latter bank obtained payment
148 South Boston Tr. Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 49, 143 N.E. 816 (1924); American
Surety Co. v. Industrial Sav. Bank, 242 Mich. 581, 219 N.W. 689, noted 27 MICH. L. RBv.
100 (1928).
149 Aigler, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal," 24 MicH. L. RBv. 809 at 823-4 (1926);
BlUTI'oN, BILLS AND NoTEs 632 et seq. (1943).
150 By §512 of Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1948) acceptance or payment was to be
final "to the extent that any party has paid for the instrument in good faith." Acceptance of
the holding in due course requirement apparently means a rejection of the view that negligence of the holder takes the case outside the Price v. Neal rule. See Comment, 43 h.L. L.
RBv. 823 (1949).
151 Sec. 304. The holding in due course requirement does not necessarily mean that
payment may be recovered from one who took after maturity. If payment on a forged check
is made to an innocent payee who gave value for the check, the drawee is not entitled to
recover since the payee is a holder in due course. Under §201, transfer of an instrument
"vests in the transferee ••• such rights as the transferor has therein." If the absence of riglit
in the drawee to recover from the payee can be considered a "right" of the payee under
§201, it would seem that the drawee cannot recover from a holder who took the check from
the payee after maturity and received payment.
152 If it be said that taking an instrument after it is overdue (or stale in the case of a
demand instrument such as a check) should warn the purchaser of possible defenses including
forgery, it needs to be remembered that the drawee pays at a still later date. The inappropriateness of the holding in due course test is recognized by the revisers in their treatment of a case
in which a purchaser is a holder in due course but learns of the forgery before he obtains
payment or certification. Clearly finality should not apply nor will it under the revision (§419).
153 214 Cal. 156, 4 P. (2d) 781 (1931).
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from the drawee and when the facts were discovered the drawee sought
recovery from the Bank of Italy. Recovery was denied on the ground
that the certification was a promise to pay the check in accordance
with its tenor at the time of certification. This was in conflict with
the common law rule and the decisions under the NIL up to 1921
when a similar decision appeared in Illinois.154
Two principal unsettled problems are suggested by the Wells
Fargo decision. First, will it be limited to a case in which there was
a purchase after the certification? The court put some emphasis on
this fact, but its major ground of decision would require the same
holding if the issue arose between the certifying bank and the holder
who obtained certification. It concluded that the certification was
binding in favor of the Bank of Italy because NIL section 62 obligates
the acceptor to pay "according to the tenor of his acceptance." Accepting the court's debatable interpretation of this phrase,1 55 it would seem
that change of position after certification is irrelevant-just as it is
under Price v. Neal.
Earlier drafts of the revision made change of position irrelevant,156
but the latest draft proposes to limit finality to the case of purchase
after certification. This is accomplished by section 419 under which
one who obtains acceptance or payment warrants to the drawee
" ... that the instrument has not been materially altered, and that
he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer
is unauthorized, except that such warranties are not given by a
holder in due course who has taken an instrument accepted after
such alteration or signature. This exception applies even though
a draft has been accepted 'payable as originally drawn' or in equivalent terms."157
154 The

Nat. City Bank of Chicago v. The Nat. Bank of the Republic of Chicago, 300

ill. 103, 132 N.E. 832 (1921).
155 For

a criticism of the decision, see Greeley, ''The Effect of Acceptance of an Altered

Bill," 27 !LI.. L. Rllv. 519 (1933).
156 Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1948) §512.
157 The proposal to provide for warranties by a

holder to the drawee is new. (The warranties under §419 are given by "any person who obtains payment or acceptance," but under
§421 the same warranties are made by a prior transferor.) The NIL contains no comparable
section and most authority is to the effect that no warranties are given: Louisa Nat. Bank v.
Kentucky Nat. Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 29 S.W. (2d) 497 (1931); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAw, 6th ed., 816-7 (1938). Contra, United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank,
214 U.S. 302, 29 S.Ct. 665 (1908).
The last sentence of the quoted portion of §419 will make inoperative the attempt sometimes made by banks to escape the effects of the Wells Fargo decision by limiting certification
to the original terms of the instrument. See l PAToN's DIGEST 800 (1940), for the form
approved by the American Bankers Association.
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This means in effect that a holder, even one in due course, who
obtains certification of a previously altered check, will be able to recover from the certifying bank only according to the original terms of
the instrument. If the check has been raised in amount, recovery will
be limited to the original amount. If the name of the payee has been
altered, as in Wells Fargo, recovery will be wholly denied. In either
case, however, if the instrument is negotiated after certification to a
holder in due course, the latter makes no warranty respecting alteration and under section 420 will be entitled to recover from the bank
on the instrument as altered.158
Another unsettled problem suggested by the Wells Fargo case concerns finality of payment of an altered check which has not been certified. Some years ago the Chief Reporter for the Commercial Code,
Professor Llewellyn, expressed the opinion that adherence to the
Wells Fargo view called "almost necessarily" for finality of payment.159
As a question of interpretation of the NIL the conclusion is untenable
and the chances are slight that it would be accepted. But that has
limited significance on the problem of how to write the law in the
revision. In earlier drafts payment was made final on the instrument
158 At least this is the objective of the two sections. Ambiguity is created by the fact
that under §419 the presenting holder also warrants "that he has a good title to the instrument."
In the Wells Fargo situation, involving alteration of the payee's name and indorsement by
the wrongdoer in the altered name, the subsequent holder has no title according to usual
analysis. The indorsement is no more effective to transfer title than an ordinary forged indorsement. Arguably therefore, the presenting holder has breached a warranty of title even
though he has not breached a warranty with respect to alteration. If it were so held, the
effect of the revision would be to repudiate the Wells Fargo decision; whereas the official
comment shows that the purpose is to codify the holding, limited as seen to change of position.
The Wells Fargo case disposed of the warranty of title argument on the ground that the
presenting holder makes no warranties to the drawee. But that is to be changed by the
revision (supra, note 157). It is not suggested that a court ought to apply the title warranty.
To the contrary, good construction in the light of the purpose of the sections would be that
the alteration warranty is controlling. It is only suggested that the sections should be written,
if feasible, so that the problem does not arise.
The title analysis raises another problem on the Wells Fargo facts. Certification is final
in favor of a holder in due course who took after certification but literally the purchaser after
certification cannot be a holder in due course because by definition he is not a holder. A
necessary indorsement is lacking. This throws upon the courts the burden of escaping this
argument in order to achieve the obvious objective. The escape lies, I suppose, in holding that
as between the certifying bank and the subsequent purchaser the indorsement is effective
even' though it may not be for other purposes as between other parties.
159 Breckenridge and Llewellyn, comment, 31 YALE L. J. 522 at 527 (1931). Ames
reached the same conclusion much earlier in "The Negotiable Instruments Law," 14 HARV.
L. R:Ev. 241 at 242 (1900).
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as altered,1 60 but the latest draft abandons this. Under section 419
the holder who obtains payment warrants that the instrument has not
been altered. This, of course, is in line with the decision to limit
finality of certification to the case of purchase in reliance thereon.
The revisers' shift of position on these two problems is indicative
of a situation in almost even balance. The choice is fairly arbitrary
and the dominant value is to get the question settled one way or the
other. The solutions proposed in the latest draft provide a fair distribution of risks between drawee and holder.161
One consequence of the provisions dealing with alterations is clearly
undesirable. Afeer certification a check is fraudulently raised and
negotiated to a holder in due course who obtains payment from the
drawee in the raised amount. Under section 419 the drawee will be
able to recover from the holder for breach of warranty. But the certifying bank should be held responsible for knowing the scope of its
own contract, that is, the amount of the check at the time of certification.162 Similarly, if a note has been fraudulently raised after issuance
and paid by the maker in the raised amount the payment should be
final. This is regarded as settled law,163 yet it will be changed by the
revision. The policies underlying Price v. Neal are fully applicable
to each case. To paraphrase the language of the Supreme Court, a
person is bound to know his own instrument.164

Sections 421 and 422-Warranties. These sections are an improvement on NIL sections 65 and 66, which they are designed to replace,
but there is still room for improvement. Under the present statute
there is considerable uncertainty as to the persons to whom warranties
run.165 The revision will remove most but not all of the uncertainty.
100 Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (1948) §512.
161 See Steffen and Starr, "A Blue Print for the

Certified Check," 13 N.C. L. Rnv. 450
at 478 (1935).
162 Contra, however, is Nat. Bank of Commerce in New York v. Nat. Mechanics' Banking Assn., 55 N.Y. 211 (1873).
163 Bank of the United States v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 333 (1825);
United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 46 S.Ct. 388, 70 L. Ed. 717 (1926).
164Jn UnitedStatesv. Nat.Exchange Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 46 S.Ct. 388 (1926), a check
drawn by the United States upon itself was fraudulently raised and paid in the raised amount.
Recovery of the overpayment was denied: "H the drawer and drawee are the same the drawer
cannot recover for an overpayment to an innocent payee because he is bound to know his own
checks." 270 U.S. at 534.
165 By NIL, §65, one who negotiates by delivery or qualified indorsement makes certain
warranties with no suggestion that they run only to a holder in due course. But §66 provides
that an unqualified indorsl:r warrants "to all subsequent holders in due course" and then refers
to §65 for a description of most of the warranties. Certainly there is no rational basis for lesser
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Every transferor for consideration makes the described warranties "to
his transferee or any subsequent holder if such person takes the instrument in good faith." With respect to the persons who may take advantage of a warranty it is believed that the revisers intend to make
no distinction between a qualified indorsement, an unqualified indorsement, and a transfer without indorsement of either order or bearer
paper.166 Identity of treatment will not be easy to achieve, however,
because of the use of the term "holder." By definition one can be a
holder only if the paper bears all necessary indorsements. In consequence, the warranties of a transferor without indorsement of order
paper literally will run only to the immediate transferee.
The effect of this interpretation will be undesirable where there
is a forged indorsement. The payee's indorsement is forged to a note
which is then sold to A, indorsed by him to B, and by B to C. Literally
A's warranties as a transferor by indorsement will run only to B. A
necessary genuine indorsement is lacking in order to make C a holder.
If the payee's indorsement was genuine but the maker's signature was
forged, the warranty of A would run to both B and C. There is no
sound basis for a different result because the forgery is of an indorsement. Although a court may be able to escape this literal interpretation,167 this does not remove the fact that the language is not well
chosen.
The sections will eliminate present uncertainties as to the scope
of warranty regarding defenses. All transferors except a qualified indorser168 warrant "that no defense of any party is good against the
transferor." This means that there is a warranty against all real defenses,
and against personal defenses if the transferor is not a holder in due
course. But one who indorses "without recourse" warrants that he
"has no knowledge of any defense of any party good against him."
Under the NIL a qualified indorser and a transferor without indorseliability on the part of an unqualified indorser than that imposed on a qualified indorser. A
satisfactory construction of the sections has not been worked out by decisions. Bru:rroN, BILLS
AND NOTES 1024 (1943).
166 The official comment to §421 states that the section applies to transfer without
indorsement "whether the instrument is then payable to order or to bearer." There is no
hint that differences are intended in the two cases with respect to the persons to whom warranties run. The Reporter's notes to earlier drafts also tend to suggest that the results described
in the text are unintended. Notes to Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (1948) 36.
167 See Queensboro Nat. Bank of City of New York v. Kelly, (C.C.A. 2d, 1931) 48
F. (2d) 574.
168 The revision drops the term "qualified indorsement" and simply describes the scope
of the undertaking of one who indorses "without recourse" or with other "words of similar
import." §422.
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ment make the same warranties. 169 It is difficult to find any reason
for imposing more extensive warranties on the latter than on the
former, as the revision does. Each has refused to assume secondary
liability, in one case by failing to indorse and in the other by qualifying his indorsement. Each should be held to such warranties as
reasonably may be imposed upon the seller of negotiable paper.170
Sections 501,502 and 503-Presentment. These sections cover the
necessity of presentment and notice of dishonor (section SOI), the
time limits for such acts (section 503), and the effects of unexcused
delay (section 502). The most striking change made by section SOI
is to eliminate the necessity of presentment for payment and notice
of dishonor in order to charge the indorser of a note. The curious
reason given for this proposal is that most notes contain a waiver
clause anyway.171
The present rules on time for presentment of checks are radically
changed. In order to charge the drawer, a check must now (usually)
be started through banking channels not later than the next business
day after receipt by the payee. Under the revision this may be done
within thirty days after issue.172 The period allowed for presentment
in order to :6.x the liability of an indorser of a check or other bill is
now uncertain. Read literally, as one court has,173 NIL section 7 I
100sec. 65.
170 Of course

the meaning of an indorsement "without recourse" is not self-evident. An
indorser can limit his obligation as he chooses, and the meaning of the words he uses should
in general correspond to commercial understanding. It seems undisputed that one meaning
of "without recourse" is to disclaim secondary liability. Beyond that, the official comment
asserts that "one good reason for an indorsement without recourse is that the indorser knows
nothing about the transaction in which such instrument was issued and is unwilling to
••• [warrant against the existence of a defense of which he does not know]." So far as I know
there is just as much (or as little) factual basis for saying the same as to one who transfers
without indorsement.
171 " ••• it is incorporated in all note forms. The only notes without a waiver now encountered are those drawn by attorneys for a particular transaction." Official comment to
§501. It might have been added that the attorneys will not succeed in their purpose if they
merely omit the waiver clause. The section requires that the indorser add to his signature the
words "presentment required" or their equivalent. Perhaps the draftsman also has overlooked
the possibility that parties (who may not be attorneys) will strike the waiver clause from a
note form.
172 The general rule of §503 is that presentment of a demand instrument must be made
within a reasonable time "after date or issue whichever is later." However,
"In the case of an uncertified check which is drawn and payable within the
United States and which is not a bank draft the following are presumed to be
reasonable periods within which to present for payment or to initiate bank collection
if there is no delay in the collection:
(a) with respect to the liability of the drawer, thirty days after issue; and
(b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven days after his indorsement."
173 Columbian Banking Co. v. Bowen, 134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451 (1908). A good
discussion of the case appears in NoRTON, BILLs .AND NOTES, 4th ed., 497, note 96 (1914).
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requires only that the instrument be presented promptly after the
"last negotiation." This means that the liability of a first indorser may
be unduly prolonged by a second indorser who holds the instrument
an unreasonably long time before negotiating it. The revision works
out a satisfactory solution for ordinary checks by the provision that
a reasonable time for presentment "with respect to the liability of an
indorser ... [is presumed to be] seven days after his indorsement."
The delay of the second indorser will operate to discharge the first indorser but will not affect his own liability.
For some reason which escapes the writer this rule as to indorsers
does not apply to certified checks, bank drafts or demand bills which
are not checks (i.e., are not drawn on a bank). As to these instruments
there is the unsatisfactory proposal that presentment to charge the
drawer and all indorsers must be within a reasonable time after issue.
One example will suffice to show the shortcomings of this rule: A
demand bank draft was issued on April I to Crawford as payee, indorsed to Llewellyn on April 26 and to Prosser on April 28. Prosser
presented for payment on May 2 and the draft was dishonored. Assuming that a reasonable time for presentment is thirty days,174 both Crawford and Llewellyn are discharged. But if the instrument were an
ordinary check they would not be, since presentment was made within
seven days after their indorsements. There is no justification for such
consequences. It is desirable to provide that an indorser of a bank
draft shall remain liable during a reasonable period after issuance, but
he should also be liable during a reasonable period after his own indorsement.
Where presentment or notice of dishonor is late, section 502 provides that "a drawer who because the drawee becomes insolvent during
the delay is deprived of funds maintained with the drawee to cover
the instrument may discharge his liability by written assignment to
the holder of his rights against the drawee in respect of such funds."
174 Actually, if thirty days is a reasonable time for presentment of an ordinary check, it
is too short for a bank draft or certified check. This may be the reason for excluding such
instruments from the ordinary check rule, though it does not explain why an indorser of such
an instrument should not be held for a reasonable time after his indorsement. If the revision
intends to recognize differences in these instruments, it is unfortunate that the recognition
has not been carried over to the rule on when a check is overdue for the purpose of holding in
due course. Section 304 applies a thirty day period to all checks, and presumably this includes
bank drafts, certified checks and cashiers' checks. It is reasonably clear that in common
understanding a check carrying the obligation of a bank does not become stale as soon as an
ordinary check. This has been recognized as to certified checks in Nat. Mechanics Bank v.
Schmelz Nat. Bank, 136 Va. 33, 116 S.E. 380 (1923); Nolan v. Bank of N.Y. Nat. Banking
Assn., 67 Barb. (N.Y.) 24, 31 (1873).
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This is to replace NIL section 186, by which the drawer of a check
is discharged "to the extent of the loss caused" by delay in making
presentment for payment. The revision gives the same effect to late
notice of dishonor as to late presentment, whereas section 186 applies
only to the latter. It applies to all bills and not merely to checks as
does section 186. And it provides a convenient means of settling the
extent of loss caused by the delay. These are meritorious changes.
Nothing is done to resolve a conflict of decision in the case of
domiciled notes. Where a note is payable at a bank, so that it is
"equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account
of" the maker (NIL, section 87) courts have disagreed on whether
the maker is to be treated as a drawer for purposes of presentment
and discharge through late presentment. The issue arises when the
bank has failed with funds of the maker on deposit which would
have been available to pay the note had it been properly presented.
There is a little authority for the view that the maker is for this purpose
a drawer who is discharged to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay.175 Most courts have concluded that the maker is a primary
party, that presentment is never required in order to charge a primary
party, and that NIL section 186 therefore has no application.176 The
revision contains a section which is the equivalent of NIL section
87.177 The possibility of conflict will remain.

Section 703-Discharge by Payment. The first subsection reads:
"The liability of any party is discharged to the extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made with the
knowledge of the right of another person to the instrument."
This will work an important change in the law. Today, if the maker of
a note pays the holder with knowledge that the note was procured from
a prior holder by fraud, the payment is not in due course and does not
discharge the maker.178 Presumably he remains liable to the prior holder
175 See Baldwin's Bank of Penn Yan v. Smith, 215 N.Y. 76, 109 N.E. 138 (1915).
This view is approved in BEOTBL's BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw, 7th ed.,
1025 (1948).
176 Binghampton Pharmacy v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S.W. 1038 (1915).
177 Sec. 122. The revisers have presented alternative forms of this section. One makes
the note the "equivalent of a bill drawn on the bank." It is stated in the official co=ent that
this fits commercial and banking understanding in New York and "surrounding states." The
other form provides that the domiciled note is not "of itself an order or authorization to the
bank to pay it." This is said to be the understanding in western and southern states.
178 "Payment is made in due course when it is made at or after the maturity of the instrument to the holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title is defective."
NIL, §88.
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who has a valid title claim against the later holder.179 The present
section will change this result. The problem is related to the defense
of the jus tertii, that is, the defense that a third person has title claim
superior to that of the plaintiff.180 The maker is not permitted to
defend the holder's action on the ground that the plaintiff has a voidable title which could be set aside at suit of the defrauded prior holder.
At the same time if he pays voluntarily with notice of this claim he
is not discharged. In short, he is not privileged to make voluntary
payment but may be forced by legal processes to pay when action is
brought.
On first thought these seem to be odd results but actually they
are not devoid of sense. The principal reason for rejecting the defense
of the jus tertii is that a decision on the title issue would not bind the
third person, who is not before the court.181 If the third person has
been made a party to the litigation, or participates therein to such
extent that he will be bound by the judgment, his title claim may be
asserted as a defense.182 If the maker is not privileged to pay when
he has notice of the claim, he is put under pressure to give the third
person an opportunity to defend. On the whole this seems desirable.
There is no indication that existing rules have worked badly. It seems
preferable to leave them unchanged-although it would be desirable
to provide the maker the remedy of interpleader.183
Even if the change proposed in this section be generally accepted,
surely it goes too far in its application to a stolen instrument. The
language seems to mean that the maker may discharge his liability
although he knows that the note was stolen (in bearer form) and that
the holder is the thief. Theft is made an exception to the general rule
of section 306, so that it may be asserted as a defense. It was concluded that the overriding policy was not to aid a thief. 184 The same
policy should be overriding under the present section.
179 Hinckley v. Union Pac. R. Co., 129 Mass. 52 (1880) (theft).
180 This has been discussed supra under section 306.
181 "An adjudication upon such defense would not bind the persons

defrauded, as they
are not parties hereto, and it would be idle." Bowles v. Oakman, 246 Mich. 674 at 678, 225
N.W. 613 (1929).
182 Bowles v. Oakman, 246 Mich. 674, 225 N.W. 613 (1929); Horrigan v. Wyman, 90
Mich. 121, 51 N.W. 187 (1892).
183 The factor mentioned in the text was considered by the drafting group. Notes to
Tentative Draft No. 3 (1947) 102. For a fuller criticism of the section, see comment, 44 lr.L.
L. REv. 88 (1949).
184 ''The one exception made in the case of theft is based on the policy which refuses to
aid a proved thief to recover, and refuses to aid him indirectly by permitting his transferee to
recover unless the transferee is a holder in due course." Official comment to §306.
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Section 706-Discharge of Surety. The :first subsection, which is
to replace NIL section 120, reads as follows:
"(I) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the
extent that without such party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not
to sue any person against whom the party has to the
knowledge of the holder a right of recourse on the instrument, or by any act or agreement postpones the right to
enforce the instrument against such person; or
(b) otherwise discharges such person, except that failure to
give notice of dishonor to any such person does not discharge any party to whom notice is duly given; or
(c) unjustifiably impairs any security for the instrument
given by or on behalf of the party or any person against
whom he has a right of recourse."
This contains a number of needed changes designed generally to bring
negotiable instruments rules into conformity with suretyship law.
A release or extension of time to a principal who is a party to the
instrument will operate equally to discharge a surety whether his liability on the instrument is primary or secondary.185 Neither a release
nor an extension of time which is made with the consent of the surety
will discharge him and this is true even though the holder does not
expressly reserve his rights against the surety.186 As is now the case, an
express reservation of rights against the surety will preserve his obligation when made in connection with either a release or an extension of
time. At least this is stated in the official comment. The section itself
is mildly ambiguous _as regards extension of time. 187 In no case does a
185 The limitation of the scope of NIL, §120 to persons "secondarily liable on the instrument" has resulted in a conffict of decision. According to most courts the section is exhaustive
and since a surety maker is primarily liable on the instrument an extension of time to the
principal does not release the surety. Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 P. 426 (1907).
Contra: Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer, 139 Iowa 176, 117 N.W. 50 (1908). Further
citations appear in Bm'IToN, BrLLs AND NOTEs 1124-5 (1943).
186 This is also true under NIL §120 ( 6) as to extension of time. But the cases are in
conffict with respect to a release, conffict created by the fact that §120 (5) provides for a
discharge upon release of the principal without reservation of rights and makes no express
exception where the surety consents. Some courts have held that the surety is rel~ed even
though he consented to the release of the principal. Phenix Nat. Bank of New York v. Hanlon,
183 Mo. App. 243, 166 S.W. 830 (1914); Howard Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Newman (Vermont, 1947) 50 A. (2d) 896. Contra: Arlington Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 214 Mass. 352, 101
N.E .. 982 (1913).
187 The ambiguity is in whether the "reservation of rights" language in subsection l(a)
quali.6es the whole of that subsection. Undoubtedly it will be construed to do so. There
would be some justification for eliminating the reservation of rights provision as to both
releases and extensions and in fact this was proposed at one stage of the revision. Notes to

306

M1cmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 48

release or extension discharge a party whose liability is in fact secondary
unless the holder has knowledge of that fact. 188 An omission in the
present statute is supplied by the provision on impairment of security.
Evidently this provision is intended to mean that an impairment of
security without the consent of the surety discharges him to the extent
of the impairment. In spite of the silence of the NIL, courts generally
have reached this conclusion.189
The section does not cover cases in which a release or extension of
time is given to a principal who is not a party to the instrument. The
release or extension must be given to a person against whom the surety
has a right of recourse "on the instrument." This leaves uncovered the
common situation of a conveyance of mortgaged land to a grantee who
takes subject to the mortgage debt and perhaps expressly assumes it. In
either case the relation of principal and surety arises between the
grantor (maker of the note) and the grantee, and the usual suretyship
rules should apply. The failure of the NIL to deal with the problem
has led to a difference of opinion.190 Unfortunately, the conllict is apt
to continue under the revision. A good part of the uncertainty and
conllict under the NIL has been due to the enactment of some suretyship rules with no clear indication as to whether other possibly applicable rules have been abrogated. The revision has the same fault.

Section 802-Payment by Negotiable Instrument. The £.rst subsection provides:
. "Unless otherwise agreed an instrument taken for the full
amount of an obligation suspends such obligation until the instrument is due, or if payable on demand until it is duly presented,
and an instrument taken for a part of the amount suspends the
Tentative Draft No. 2 (1947) 108, 109. But the great weight of the argument for such
elimination applies to release. There would be no rational basis for retaining the provision as
to releases while eliminating it for extensions.
188 The situation covered is where an accommodation party signs in the position of a
primary party on the instrument and the fact of accommodation is unknown to the holder.
The NIL is silent on the point.
189 Frazier v. First Nat. Bank of Ellwood City, 2 Ohio App. 159 (1913); BEUTEL's
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE lNsTRUMENTS I.Aw, 7th ed., 11_59 et seq. (1948). Contra: Merchants' Nat. Bank of Billings v. Smith, 59 Mont. 280, 196 P. 523 (1921).
190 Where the grantee expressly assumed the mortgage debt, it was held in Industrial
Trust Co. v. Goldman, 59 R.I. 11, 193 A. 852 (1937) that an extension of time to the
grantee discharged the maker of the note. Contra: Peter v. Finzer, 116 Neb. 380 (1928).
Where the grantee did not assume the mortgage debt it was held in Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. Lindley, 97 Ind. App. 575, 183 N.E. 127 (1933) that an extension of time to
the grantee discharged the maker to the extent of the value of the mortgaged land at the
time of the extension. Contra: Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Chotiner, 8 Cal. (2d) 110,
64 P. (2d) 138 (1936).
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obligation pro tanto. When the instrument is dishonored action
may be maintained on either the instrument or the original obligation. When the instrument is negotiated otherwise than for
collection or when due presentment is not made or excused, such
obligation or the proportionate amount thereof is discharged."
The general problem is wheth~r a negotiable instrument given to a
creditor is absolute or only conditional payment. If absolute, the underlying obligation is satisfied; if conditional, it is said to be suspended.
It is generally recognized that an instrument to which the debtor is
not a party, given for an obligation which arises in the same transaction
(a "present'' debt, as the cases say) is presumptively taken by the creditor as absolute payment. On the other hand the same type of instrument presumptively is taken only as conditional payment of a precedent
debt. The distinction appeared as early as Lord Holt's time: in Ward
v. Evans1 91 he observed that "taking a note ... [of a third person] for
goods sold is a payment, because it was part of the original contract;
but paper is no payment where there is a precedent debt. For when
such a note is given in payment, it is always intended to-be taken under
this condition, to be payment if the money be paid thereon in convenient time." Although sometimes ignored, the distinction has been made
in modern times, as in a relatively recent decision of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. Bonds were delivered to a buyer who gave a cashier's
check of the Harriman Bank for the price. The bank failed to open the
next day, its check was not paid, and the seller sought to recover the
price from the buyer. Recovery was denied; the parties were presumed
to have understood that the check was "taken as the equivalent of absolute performance"; hence the risk of bank failure was on the seller
instead of the buyer.192
1912 LI. Raym. 929, 92 Eng. Rep. 120 (1702). Holt had made the same distinction
in Clark v. Mundal, 1 Salk. 124, 91 Eng. Rep. 116 (1692).
192 "No doubt the general rule is that, where the seller takes the buyer's check in
payment without more, the check is taken only as conditional payment of the debt which
is not discharged unless, upon presentation for payment in due course, ihe check is paid••••
But there is a variation of the general rule where the debt is created simultaneously with
the obligation to make immediate payment and the creditor then takes the credit of a third
party instead of insisting upon receiving payment in cash though his contract gives him that
right." Hamilton v. R. S. Dickson & Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 107 at 108.
To the same effect are: Atlas S.S. Co. v. Colombian Land Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1900)
102 F. 358 (third party draft was conditional payment of precedent debt); New York &
Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Texas Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1922) 282 F. 221 (third party draft was
absolute payment of present debt); Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns (N.Y.) 409 (1814)
(third party note was absolute payment of present debt); Hall v. Stevens, 116 N.Y. 201,
22 N.E. 394 (1889) (third party bank draft was absolute payment of present debt; the
"question depends upon whether the draft was taken for a present or a precedent debt").
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The cases emphasize the importance of two factors: whether the
instrument is taken for a precedent debt or one arising in the same
transaction, and whether the debtor is a party to the instrument. If the
debtor is a party, either as maker,1 93 drawer,1 94 acceptor1 95 or indorser, 196 the tendency is to hold that the instrument in all cases is only
conditional payment. The revision ignores these factors and treats the
instrument as only conditional payment in every case unless a contrary
understanding appears. The official comment to the section states that
it is "intended to settle conflicts," with no suggestion that it also may
effect an important change in the law.
Possibly the courts will feel free to preserve existing rules through
use of a slightly different technique than has been used heretofore.
The accepted approach has been that the understanding of the parties
controls, but in the absence of any other evidence on the matter certain
presumptions are made depending upon the variables already noted.
In the case, for example, of a buyer's remittance of a bank draft payable to his seller, "the presumption is that it was agreed to be taken in
payment."197 A court which is inclined to reach the same result under
the revision can do so by finding such an agreement in fact. The finding, of course, will rest upon the conclusion that this is the probable
understanding in this type of transaction.198
Whether existing distinctions should be perpetuated is another
question. Movement should not be in the direction of making all payments conditional. If there is to be change it should be in the direction
of according finality to payment by certain types of instruments, specifically bank drafts and cashiers' checks, without regard to whether the
obligation is precedent or present.199 These instruments come close
Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U.S. 287 (1889).
v. The Merchants Trust Co., 118 Conn. 586, 173 A. 777 (1934).
195 No case has been found but it would seem that the situation is analogous to the
taking of the debtor's note. See Kessler, Levi and Ferguson, "Some Aspects of Payment
by Negotiable Instrument: A Comparative Study," 45 YALE L. J. 1373 at 1381 (1936).
196 This is more doubtful but is supported by the following cases: Whitney v. Goin,
20 N.H. 354 (1850); Butler v. Haight, 8 Wend. (N.Y.) 535 (1832); Monroe v. Hoff,
5 Denio (N.Y.) 360 (1848). Accord: NonToN, BILLS AND NoTEs, 4th ed., 27 (1914);
6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., 5275 (1938).
197 Hall v. Stevens, 116 N.Y. 201 at 206 (1899). The obligation was treated as
present rather than precedent, as is usual in sales of goods cases.
198 There is some suggestion in the official comment to section 802 that this approach
is contemplated.
199 On the difficulty of drawing the distinction between a present and a precedent
obligation, compare the Atlas and Cuba Mail cases, supra note 192.
193

194 Bassett
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enough to money in their use that payment thereby could well be
treated as the equivalent of a cash payment. 200
The subsection provides that a failure to make due presentment of
the instrument discharges the underlying obligation. Generalization
regarding present law is hazardous, but it is believed that the decisions
fit loosely into this pattern: the debtor is discharged on the underlying
debt only to the extent that he is discharged on the instrument; when
he is not a party to the instrument he is discharged to the extent of the
loss caused by the delay, which in the situations usually presented
means a complete discharge. 201 The revision, of course, does not follow
this pattern. However, this will have significant consequences only in
a few situations. The debtor-drawer of a check will be discharged on
the underlying obligation by the delay but will in effect remain liable
on the check except to the extent that the delay harmed him. The
debtor-drawer of a bill which is not a check will be in the same position; whereas under present law he probably is discharged both on the
bill and the debt regardless of loss. The debtor-indorser of a third party
note will remain liable on the note for the reason that the revision eliminates the necessity of presentment to fix such liability. The debtorindorser of a check or other bill will be completely discharged on both
the instrument and the debt. This is a situation which has troubled
some courts. Departing from the pattern suggested above, there are a
few holdings that, although the debtor is discharged as an indorser, he
remains liable on the debt unless the delay harmed him. 202
Turning to the situation in which the debtor is not a party to the
instrument, the common case is where he buys a bank draft payable to
his creditor and remits it in payment of his debt. If the draft is given
for a present debt and the court follows the view that it is taken in
absolute payment, there is of course no problem as to the effect of delayed presentment on the debt. The problem does arise, however, if
the draft initially constituted only conditional payment. In the cases
presenting the problem the drawer failed and the draft was dishonored.
The analogy to the case in which the drawer gives his own check and
the drawee fails is obvious. In that case the drawer is discharged on
200 Query, however, where the bank is paying its own obligation by its own instrument. This situation was presented in Bassett v. Merchants Trust Co., 118 Conn. 586,
173 A. 777 (1934).
201 The authorities are cited in the article by Kessler, Levi and Ferguson, supra note
195, at 1378-1400. The writers do not reach any such generalization as is made above.
202 Cases cited by Kessler, Levi and Ferguson, supra note 195, at 1397, note 109.
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the instrument to the extent of the loss caused by the delay, and probably to the same extent on the debt. This is in substance the result
which has been reached in the case of remittance by bank draft. The
judgment, however, has been that the drawer is wholly discharged,
since the creditor holds the bank draft and can £le a claim against
the failed drawer in the liquidation proceeding/~ 03
The revision will have significant consequences in the remittance
situation. In the case just described, if the drawer failed before the
time for due presentment had run out, the late presentment did not
cause the loss. On these facts it is believed that the debtor would now
remain liable on his debt, though no holding can be cited.204 Certainly
"this should be true if the court accepts the analogy of the ordinary
check case. Under the revision, however, the debtor will be discharged
where the late presentment does not harm him. In fact, he will be discharged even though the drawer has not failed. This clearly is contrary
to present understanding. The best justification for these consequences
is that mentioned above, that is, probably remittance by bank draft
should be treated as final payment whether the debt is present or
precedent.
In spite of the length of this paper many significant aspects of the
revision have not been mentioned. Enactment by the states will mean
that judges and lawyers will have to face anew many problems which
are now settled in the jurisdiction. There will be new language to read,
in most instances intended to preserve existing rules but still calling for
fresh consideration. This, of course, is a part of the price of a thoroughgoing revision. The advantages to be gained far outweigh this disadvantage. Great improvements have been made through resolving
numerous uncertainties and conflicts and through changing some undesirable rules. It will be unfortunate, however, if Article 3 is adopted
by the Institute and Commissioners without change. The criticisms in
this paper fall roughly into two groups. Some are directed primarily at
shortcomings of draftsmanship (which on the whole is superb), where
the possible or probable results may not be intended. Others are in the
realm of judgment and policy on which men can reasonably differ. The
writer believes that there are better solutions.
203 Commercial Investment Trust v. Lundgren-Wittensten Co., 173 Minn. 83, 216
N.W. 531 (1927). Other cases are cited by Kessler, Levi and Ferguson, supra note 195,
at 1400, note 123.
204 It is significant, however, that in the Commercial Investment Trust case, supra
note 203, the court pointed out that the drawer had failed after the expiration of a reasonable
time for presentment.

